Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing in Initiative Cases by Manheim, Karl et al.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2015
Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing in Initiative Cases
Karl Manheim
John S. Caragozian
Donald Warner
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karl Manheim, John S. Caragozian & Donald Warner, Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing in Initiative Cases, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1069
(2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol48/iss4/1
1069 
FIXING HOLLINGSWORTH: STANDING IN 
INITIATIVE CASES 
Karl Manheim,∗ John S. Caragozian∗∗ & Donald Warner∗∗∗ 
          In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court dismissed an 
appeal filed by the “Official Proponents” of California’s Proposition 8, 
which banned same-sex marriage in California. Chief Justice Roberts’ 
majority opinion held that initiative sponsors lack Article III standing to 
defend their ballot measures even when state officials refuse to defend 
against constitutional challenges. As a result, Hollingsworth provides 
state officers with the ability to overrule laws that were intended to 
bypass the government establishment—in effect, an “executive veto” of 
popularly-enacted initiatives. 
          The Article examines this new “executive veto” in depth. It places 
Hollingsworth in context, discussing the initiative process in California, 
and the history of the federal lawsuit challenging Proposition 8. 
          An in-depth discussion of Hollingsworth follows. The particular 
issue presented by the appellants, their claim to standing based on their 
status as representatives of the People of California, and the Court’s 
treatment of that issue, is scrutinized. This includes the Court’s 
rejection of California law on the legal status of initiative proponents, 
and its adoption of the Restatement of Agency as the basis for Article III 
standing.  
          After concluding that Hollingsworth establishes an “executive 
veto” over the initiative process, the Article proceeds to examine the 
potential effect of this in California and the thirty-six other “direct 
democracy” states.  
          Finally, the authors present a series of “fixes” to Hollingsworth’s 
executive veto. These could assure defense of initiatives in the future, 
protecting them from the fate that Proposition 8 suffered in 
Hollingsworth. 
∗ Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
∗∗ Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
∗∗∗  Adjunct Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The authors are indebted to their
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their research assistant, Natalya Samsonova, for her tireless and invaluable help.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 the United States Supreme Court 
held that official sponsors of successful state initiatives lack standing 
to defend their initiatives, even when state officials charged with 
defending and enforcing state law refuse to do so.2 In so holding, the 
Court has provided state officials with an “executive veto” over 
voter-created laws, because, without their active defense, these laws 
may now go undefended in federal court.3 The substantive issue in 
Hollingsworth—the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, a 
voter-approved initiative that banned same-sex marriage—was 
controversial in itself.4 But the Court’s decision to dispose of the 
case on standing grounds produced additional controversy. The very 
purpose of initiatives in California, and in the thirty-seven other 
states with this traditional form of direct democracy,5 is to allow 
voters to overrule officialdom, but Hollingsworth inverts the 
initiative process by allowing executive officials to overrule voters. 
Hollingsworth was decided on the same day as United States v. 
Windsor,6 which invalidated key provisions of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA).7 By refusing to recognize same-sex 
marriages at the federal level, DOMA was similar to Proposition 8 in 
substance. Also similar were the procedural postures of the two 
cases. In Windsor, federal executives declined to defend the law in 
federal court, just as their California counterparts had declined to 
defend their state’s initiative. But the symmetry ended with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. Different five-to-four majorities held that 
the absence of executive officials did not deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction to decide Windsor, but did in Hollingsworth. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2. Id. at 2668.
3. See William Peacock, Perry and Windsor: Threads of Standing, Constitutional
Quandaries, FINDLAW (July 8, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court/2013 
/07/perry-and-windsor-threads-of-standing-constitutional-quandaries.html. 
4. Just before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court ruled that state laws barring
same-sex marriage violated the due process and equal protection clauses. Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015).  
5. See John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the
Twentieth Century, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 619, 620–22 (2000). 
6. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (invalidating DOMA, (Pub.L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C)). 
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This Article provides a critical examination of Hollingsworth 
and the Supreme Court’s treatment of standing in initiative cases. It 
proposes that the Court severely undermined direct democracy as a 
check on government abuses. It concludes that Hollingsworth was 
wrongly decided, and that, absent corrective action, state executives 
possess the ability to veto the people’s sovereign power, as exercised 
through the initiative.8 
II. THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS
A. A Brief History of the Initiative in California
Ever since the state’s admission to the Union in 1850, the 
California Constitution has embodied a core concept of popular 
sovereignty. “All political power is inherent in the people. 
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good 
may require.”9 The initiative process is a dramatic manifestation of 
this political power that has lasted for more than a century. 
In 1911 California became the eleventh American state to 
provide for voter-initiated statutes and state constitutional 
amendments.10 The passage of the constitutional amendment that 
brought in the initiative was ultimately the product of a nationwide 
reform effort usually called the “Progressive Movement.”11 In 
8. In one way, this is an odd article for us to write since we have criticized California’s
initiative process. We believe it has done more harm than good. See Karl Manheim et al., 
Rebooting California—Initiatives, Conventions And Government Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
393, 402–04 (2011); Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative 
Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165 (1998). Despite our views, in this writing we 
conclude that, if initiatives are to remain a check on the perceived failures of state government, 
some “fix” to Hollingsworth will be necessary. 
 We have also been critical of Proposition 8 on the merits. See, e.g., John Caragozian, 
Avoiding Future Embarrassment, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 19, 2008, at 6; Brief for Karl M. 
Manheim as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 
2009) (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078). 
9. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (derived from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1849)).
10. THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://www.iandrinstitute.org
/statewide_i&r.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). For an historical overview of the initiative 
process, see generally Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, 
slip op. at 3–6 (U.S. June 29, 2015). 
11. V.O. KEY & WINSTON CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA,
423 (G.M. McBride et al. eds., 1939); see also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 84 (Cal. 2009) (“As we have 
observed in past cases, ‘The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the 
initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive 
movement of the early 1900’s.’”). 
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California, Progressives focused much of their efforts in breaking the 
Southern Pacific Railroad’s “control of . . . political and economic 
institutions.”12 As the California Supreme Court recently explained: 
[T]he progressive movement in California that introduced
the initiative power into our state Constitution grew out of
dissatisfaction with the then-governing public officials and
a widespread belief that the people had lost control of the
political process. In this setting, “[t]he initiative was viewed
as one means of restoring the people’s rightful control over
their government . . . .”13
The amendment establishing the initiative passed by a margin of
more than three to one.14 Among its provisions was a requirement 
that any initiative, whether for a statute or constitutional amendment, 
could be brought before the voters by a petition with signatures equal 
to 8 percent or more of the voters in the previous gubernatorial 
election.15 
In the century plus since establishing the initiative, there has 
been a great deal of litigation over individual propositions. This often 
12. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 423; see also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 84 (“In California,
a principal target of the movement’s ire was the Southern Pacific Railroad, which the movement’s 
supporters believed not only controlled local public officials and state legislators but also had 
inordinate influence on the state’s judges.”). 
13. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011) (second alteration in
original) (citations omitted); see also JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 
IN CALIFORNIA, 1898–1998 5 (2000) (discussing a growing desire of average citizens to take back 
legislative power).  
 As the discussion in text below describes, the action that became Hollingsworth v. Perry 
in the Supreme Court went through four forums. It produced a large number of ancillary 
proceedings and decisions. For the sake of clarity, this Article will use the following 
nomenclature with regard to the five principal proceedings in the matter:  
(1) Perry I—The district court’s judgment, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); 
(2) Perry II—The Ninth Circuit order certifying a question re California law to the
California Supreme Court, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011); 
(3) Perry III—The California Supreme Court’s response to the Ninth Circuit, Perry
v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011);
(4) Perry IV—The Ninth Circuit’s decision on the merits, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012); and 
(5) Hollingsworth—The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
14. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 440. The amendment is now found primarily in
Article II, sections 8 and 10, of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10. 
15. KEY & CROUCH, supra note 11, at 441. Currently, the requirement is 5 percent for
statutory initiatives, 8 percent for proposed constitutional amendments. CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 8(b).
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has been with regard to two constitutional issues, the so-called 
“single subject rule,”16 and the distinction between an “amendment” 
to the Constitution, which may be enacted by initiative, and a 
“revision,” which may not.17 The validity of Proposition 8 was itself 
initially challenged in state court as an invalid “revision” due to its 
sweeping effect on the equality principle set forth in the California 
Constitution. It was only after that challenge failed18 that the federal 
lawsuit in Hollingsworth was filed. 
Opposition has developed, not only to particular proposed or 
enacted initiatives, but also to the process itself. One aspect of 
initiative law that has produced some of that criticism is the 
restriction on the Legislature’s ability to amend an initiative statute.19 
This, in its effect, elevates initiative statutes to a status above other 
statutes, to a near-constitutional level.20 
Criticism has also arisen out of the fact that the petition 
requirement, combined with the ever-increasing number of voters in 
California, has effectively turned the process over to those who can 
pay for extensive, and thus expensive, petition circulation drives.21 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the California Supreme Court 
has consistently and zealously guarded the people’s right of “direct 
democracy,” the right to superintend or correct the state legislature 
by way of initiative. 
B. The Initiative Power Is a Sovereign Power
The California Supreme Court has held: 
Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government 
ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of 
the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the 
16. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); see, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083–84
(Cal. 1990) (en banc). 
17. See, e.g., Strauss, 207 P.3d at 78–122.
18. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
19. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the 
initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”). 
20. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 9–10 (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://policyarchive.org/collections/cgs/index?section=5&id=5800. California is the only state 
among more than thirty direct-democracy states that has a constitutional provision forbidding 
legislative amendment or repeal of initiative statutes. Id. 
21. See id. at 10–12; LARRY J. SABATO ET AL., DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? (2000); DAVID 
S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED (2000).
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people, but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it ‘the 
duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the 
people’ . . . ‘[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply 
a liberal construction to this power wherever it is 
challenged . . . If doubts can reasonably be resolved in 
favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve 
it.’22 
Deference to the initiative power goes beyond that which courts 
ordinarily give to legislation. The California Supreme Court has 
noted that the power of initiative “is essentially a legislative 
authority.”23 When acting in that capacity, however, the people are 
not merely acting as an alternative legislature; rather, they are 
exercising their fundamental sovereignty:24 it is “that safeguard 
which the people should retain for themselves, to supplement the 
work of the legislature by initiating those measures which the 
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to enact.”25 
In exercising the initiative power, the voters act as a 
super-legislature,26 with power greater than that of the institutional 
legislature in at least three ways:27 
(1) A statutory initiative cannot be amended by the Legislature,
unless the initiative’s own language allows for such amendment.28 
(2) An initiative may not be vetoed by the governor.29
(3) The people also have the power to amend the California
Constitution.30 The Legislature has no such power. The Legislature, 
by two-thirds vote of both houses, may propose a constitutional 
22. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011) (alteration and emphasis in
original). 
23. Id. at 1027.
24. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 345 (Cal. 1979) (citation omitted)
(“The California Constitution declares that ‘people have the right to . . . petition government for 
redress of grievances . . . .’ That right in California is, moreover, vital to a basic process in the 
state’s constitutional scheme—direct initiation of change by the citizenry through initiative, 
referendum, and recall.”), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
25. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sec’y of State, Proposed
Amends to Const. with Legis. Reasons, Gen. Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911)). 
26. See Manheim & Howard, supra note 8, at 1232.
27. See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995).
28. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c). The disablement of amendment by the Legislature is unique
to California. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 200 (Cal. 2010). 
29. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1007.
30. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
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amendment, but the amendment does not become effective without 
the people’s approval.31 
The printed argument in favor of adopting the initiative process 
in 1911 claimed that it would give “people power to control 
legislation of the state [and] the power to pass judgment upon the 
acts of the legislature.”32 This furthers James Madison’s prescription: 
“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . not only that 
all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted 
with it should be kept in dependence on the people.”33 Accordingly, 
when acting by initiative, the people displace the institutional 
legislature and assume that role themselves. But, as noted, the 
people’s power of initiative is more than an ordinary legislative 
power; it is a reserved sovereign power. 
III. THE HISTORY OF PROPOSITION 8
A. Genesis of the California Marriage Protection Act—
Proposition 8 
The right of same-sex couples to marry has been a prominent 
issue on America’s political, legal and cultural agenda for more than 
a decade. Many state constitutions have been amended, either to 
allow or to prohibit same-sex marriage.34 Courts have also faced the 
issue, with several holding that gays and lesbians have a state or 
federal constitutional right to marry.35 Congress too became 
enmeshed with gay rights, passing two laws in the 1990s—Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell36 and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).37 
31. Id. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.
32. California Proposition 7, the Initiative & Referendum Amendment (October 1911),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_7,_the_Initiative_%26_Referendum
_Amendment_(October_1911) (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
33. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at
30–31 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 223 (James Madison)). 
34. William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FL.
COASTAL L. REV. 233 (2005). 
35. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d
968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
36. Don’t Ask, Don't Tell, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed 2010).
37. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2012)) (barring same-sex married couples from federal marriage benefits and being
recognized as “spouses” for purposes of federal laws, while also allowing states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other states).
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As has been the case with many social issues, California became 
a battleground in the fight over same-sex marriage. In 2000, the 
voters approved an initiative statute—Proposition 22—that limited 
marriage to heterosexual couples.38 Proposition 22 was challenged 
on many fronts. While a constitutional challenge was pending in 
state court, some local public officials determined they were 
constitutionally required to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples, notwithstanding the initiative. The California Supreme 
Court enjoined that action, holding that state and local officials had 
to comply with Proposition 22 until there was a judicial 
determination of invalidity.39 In the meantime, the California 
Legislature passed two bills authorizing same-sex marriage,40 but 
they were vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.41 Then in 
2008, the California Supreme Court invalidated Proposition 22, 
holding that discrimination against same-sex couples violated the 
state constitution.42 
Subsequently, opponents of same-sex marriage mounted another 
effort, this time to amend the state constitution. The “California 
Marriage Protection Act,” designated “Proposition 8,”43 was 
approved at the November 2008 general election by a margin of 52 
to 48 percent.44 Another state court challenge was mounted on state 
constitutional grounds. Opponents of the initiative argued that 
Proposition 8 had “revised,” rather than merely “amended” the state 
38. California Defense of Marriage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (repealed 2015) (“Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”). 
39. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
40. See Assemb. B. 43, 2007 Assemb. (Cal. 2007); Assemb. B. 849, 2005–2006 Sess.
(Cal. 2005). 
41. Governor’s Veto Message to Cal. Assemb. on A.B. 43, 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2007),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_43_vt_20071012.html; 
Governor's Veto Message to Cal. Assemb. on A.B. 849, 2005–2006 Sess. (Cal. 2005), 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0801-0850/ab_849_vt_20050929.html. The 
Governor stated that the Legislature could not reverse an initiative passed by the people of 
California, and that the appropriate venue for the resolution of same-sex marriage was the 
California Supreme Court, where the challenge to Proposition 22 was then pending. See Assemb. 
B. 43; Assemb. B. 849.
42. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
43. CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp.
2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The initiative added article I, section 7.5 to the California Constitution. 
It reads: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” 
44. Debra Bowen, Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of Vote: November 4, 2008, General
Election 1, 13 (2008), https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf. 
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constitution.45 This time the California Supreme Court sided with the 
initiative proponents, holding that Proposition 8 was an 
“amendment,” and therefore valid under state law.46 
B. Proceedings in District Court (Perry I)
The next phase in the legal struggle over marriage equality took 
place in federal court. In 2009, two same-sex couples who had 
applied for, but had been denied, marriage licenses, filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.47 
They alleged that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. 
Because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against states,48 
plaintiffs named as defendants Governor Schwarzenegger, Attorney 
General Jerry Brown, other state officials, and the clerks of Alameda 
and Los Angeles counties (who had refused to issue marriage 
licenses to plaintiffs). 
In their pleadings in district court, the state defendants stated 
their belief that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, and indicated 
they would not defend the measure. Proposition 8’s official 
proponents, including State Senator Dennis Hollingsworth,49 moved 
to intervene as defendants. No one opposed the motion, and in a 
minute order of four brief paragraphs, District Judge Vaughn Walker 
granted it.50 Judge Walker began by stating that, under Federal Rule 
45. See supra text accompanying note 20. Compare CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2
(amendment or revision by Legislature or convention), with id. § 3 (amendment by initiative). 
46. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
47. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; complaint available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts
.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/1-1.pdf. 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh
Amendment embodies unwritten pre-constitutional visions of state sovereignty, and forecloses 
suits against states in both state and federal court, with limited exception. See Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999). However, per the “stripping doctrine” of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), state officials charged with enforcing state law can be sued as surrogates for the state, at 
least with regard to injunctive relief. Thus, it is commonplace for challenges to state law to name 
either the state governor or attorney general, or both, as defendants. 
49. The other proponents of the initiative were Gail J. Knight, Martin F. Gutierrez, Hak-
Shing William Tam, and Mark A. Jansson, organized as “ProtectMarriage.com” (collectively, 
“Individual Proponents”). Request for Title and Summary of Proposed Initiative, 
ProtectMarriage.com (Oct. 1, 2007), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives 
/pdfs/07-0068%20%28i737_07-0068_Initiative%29.pdf? (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
50. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292 VRW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55594 (N. D.
Cal. June 30, 2009). The plaintiffs decided not to oppose proponents’ intervention motion, 
because, inter alia, “a vigorous, competent defense of Proposition 8 . . . would make [an] ultimate 
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of Civil Procedure 24(a),51 Senator Hollingsworth and the other 
sponsors (whom California law terms “Official Proponents”) have a 
right to intervene if: 
(1) their motion is timely; (2) they have a significant
protectable interest relating to the transaction that is the
subject of the action; (3) they are so situated that the
disposition of the action may practically impair or impede
their ability to protect their interest; and (4) that interest is
not adequately represented by the parties to the action.52
Judge Walker found that the Official Proponents satisfied all of
the Rule 24(a) factors, noting that, with regard to factor (4), “no 
defendant has argued that Prop 8 is constitutional.”53 He then added, 
“[s]ignificantly, with respect to the last factor, although the 
responsibilities of the Attorney General of California contemplate 
that he shall enforce the state’s laws in accordance with 
constitutional limitations, Attorney General Brown has informed the 
court that he believes Prop 8 is unconstitutional.”54 
At the end of a lengthy trial, Judge Walker ruled that Proposition 
8 was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.55 After 
judgment, both Jerry Brown, who had been elected governor in the 
interim, and Kamela Harris, who had been elected Attorney General, 
declined to appeal. The County Clerks of the County of Alameda and 
the County of Los Angeles, who had also been named Defendants, 
also chose not to appeal. Hollingsworth and the other Official 
victory . . . that much more credible.” DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE 
DREAM: THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY 69 (2014). 
51. Rule 24(a) provides:
(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
intervene who (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately
represent that interest. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
52. Perry, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55594, at *5–6.
53. Id. at *6.
54. Id. at *6–7 (citations omitted). Judge Walker also granted in part the City of San
Francisco’s motion to intervene, but denied all other requests by both proponents and opponents 
of the initiative. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947 (2009) (affirming 
denial of intervention by the Campaign for California Families, since it was adequately 
represented by the Official Proponents). 
55. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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Proponents, as intervenor-defendants, filed and prosecuted the 
appeal.56 
Judge Walker denied proponents’ motion for stay of the 
injunction pending appeal, holding that their moving papers failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on appeal.57 Moreover, he 
expressed doubt that they had standing to appeal, even though he had 
allowed them to intervene.58 
The rationale for this apparent turn-about was not altogether 
clear, but three factors may have been involved. First, Judge Walker 
suggested that his injunction did not prohibit proponents from 
engaging in any activity. Specifically, he noted that “California does 
not grant proponents the authority or the responsibility to enforce 
Proposition 8.”59 He added that, as “private citizens,” the proponents 
lacked “authority regarding the issuance of marriage licenses or 
registration of marriages,” which were the acts covered by the 
injunction.60 
Second, the judge held that proponents lacked any individual 
injury that might confer standing. After proponents had intervened, 
Judge Walker had asked them “to identify a harm they would face ‘if 
an injunction against Proposition 8 is issued,’” but they “failed to 
articulate even one specific harm they may suffer as a 
consequence . . . .”61 
Third, Judge Walker stated that when he granted proponents’ 
intervention motion, he “did not address their standing independent 
of the existing parties.”62 While he did not explain this statement, he 
appeared to hold that the proponents’ “significant protectible [sic] 
interest,” while sufficient for Rule 24 purposes, did not necessarily 
confer standing independent of that of other parties.63 Once the 
parties with standing (i.e., named state defendants) chose not to 
56. Brief of Petitioners, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013
WL 457384. 
57. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135–37 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1136. The California Supreme Court later disagreed with Judge Walker’s
assessment. See infra Part III.F. 
60. Id. The permanent injunction was entered against all defendants, including the Official
Proponents, but it did not require them “to refrain from anything, as they are not (and cannot be) 
responsible for the application or regulation of California marriage law.” Id. 
61. Id.; see also id. at 1137 (“[Official] proponents make no argument that they . . . will be
irreparably injured absent a stay . . . .”). 
62. Id. at 1136.
63. Id.
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appeal, intervenors had to establish standing on their own. While this 
conclusion was not expressed in Judge Walker’s order, it was later 
validated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth. 
Although Judge Walker denied proponents’ motion for a stay 
during the appeal, he did stay the injunction for six days in order to 
allow the Ninth Circuit to decide whether to issue a stay.64 
Proponents, as defendant-intervenors, filed an emergency motion for 
stay with the Ninth Circuit, which was granted,65 despite the state 
defendants’ opposition.66 Attorney General Brown again agreed with 
plaintiffs that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional and indicated that 
the state would not appeal the district court order.67 
Other than the Attorney General’s appearance in the Ninth 
Circuit to argue against a stay, none of the original state defendants 
formally participated in the case thereafter.68 
C. Initial Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry II)
Since the named state defendants chose not to appeal Judge 
Walker’s decision,69 the proponents, as defendant-intervenors, filed a 
formal Notice of Appeal.70 This created the standing problem that is 
the focus of this Article, as well as some ancillary procedural 
questions.71 
64. Id. at 1138–39.
65. Order for Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug 5, 2010).
66. Attorney Gen.’s Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW). 
67. Id. at 1–2. State defendants remained in the caption of the case as Appellees and the
attorney general “appeared” in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of opposing the stay. 
Notwithstanding these formalisms, state defendants were treated as non-parties on appeal. The 
significance of the caption notation and the attorney general’s limited appearance was not 
discussed by either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court. But such appearances are apparently 
insufficient to cure jurisdictional defects. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61 (1986) 
(attorney general may be a “party” of interest without being an appellant). 
68. The Attorney General did file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court urging affirmance.
See Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, (No. 12-144), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02
/12-144-bsac-California.pdf.
69. The County Clerk and Board of Supervisors of Imperial County, California, filed a
“protective notice of appeal” along with an appeal of the district court’s denial of its motion to 
intervene as defendant. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention and then dismissed 
the county’s protective appeal for lack of standing. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 903 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
70. Notice of Appeal, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (No. 09-CV-2292), ECF No. 713. 
71. In his concurrence dismissing Imperial County’s appeal for lack of standing, Judge
Reinhardt criticized both plaintiffs and defendants for their pleadings and tactics. Plaintiffs, he 
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In granting the stay pending appeal, the Ninth Circuit directed 
proponents to brief the issue of their standing to prosecute the 
appeal.72 In response, proponents argued that they had an 
individualized interest in upholding the validity of the initiative they 
had sponsored.73 As “an alternative and independent additional basis 
for standing,” proponents also claimed that, pursuant to California 
law, “they may directly assert the State’s interest in defending” 
Proposition 8 “as agents of the people.”74 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that if either of these interests 
existed, proponents would have standing. But that this question 
“rises or falls on whether California law affords them the interest or 
authority” they assert.75 Since California law on that point was not 
clear to the court, the Ninth Circuit certified that issue to the 
California Supreme Court.76 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit asked the 
California Court a two-pronged question: 
[under California’s laws, do] official proponents of an 
initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in 
the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity, which would enable them 
to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its 
adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, 
when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do 
so?77 
Certification is discretionary with the California Supreme 
Court.78 It accepted the certified question and agreed to answer it.79 
opined, could have avoided jurisdictional uncertainty by naming a broader range of defendants, 
including the clerks of all of California’s fifty-six counties. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 
898, 907–08. (9th Cir. 2011) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). He also chastised the governor and 
attorney general for not defending the initiative “as was ordinarily their obligation.” Id. at 908. 
72. Order for Perry v. Schwarzenegger at 2, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010).
73. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
76. Id. at 1193 (“[I]t is critical that we be advised of the rights under California law of the
official proponents of an initiative measure to defend the constitutionality of that measure upon 
its adoption by the People when the state officers charged with the laws’ enforcement, including 
the Attorney General, refuse to provide such a defense.”). 
77. Id.
78. CAL. CT. R. 8.548.
79. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. S189476, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 1658 (Cal. Feb. 16, 2011).
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D. The California Supreme Court’s Answer
to the Ninth Circuit (Perry III) 
In Perry III, the California Supreme Court unanimously 
answered yes to the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s question, 
holding that “the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative 
measure are authorized to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of 
the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.”80 
However, the California Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on 
the first part of the Ninth Circuit’s question, as to whether the 
proponents possess any “particularized interest in the initiative’s 
validity.”81 
In holding that an initiative’s official proponents may assert the 
state’s interest, the California Supreme Court analyzed proponents’ 
role in the initiative process. The Court began by emphasizing the 
long-held importance of initiatives in California.82 The Court then 
added that protecting the primacy of the initiative process, especially 
from interference from elected officials, had led to the proponents’ 
official status.83 
Neither the Governor, the Attorney General, nor any other 
executive or legislative official has the authority to veto or 
invalidate an initiative measure that has been approved by 
the voters. It would exalt form over substance to interpret 
California law in a manner that would permit these public 
officials to indirectly achieve such a result by denying the 
official initiative proponents the authority to step in to 
assert the state’s interest in the validity of the measure or to 
appeal a lower court judgment invalidating the measure 
when those public officials decline to assert that interest or 
to appeal an adverse judgment.84 
80. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
81. Id. at 1015.
82. Id. at 1005.
83. Id. at 1006.
84. Id. at 1007; see also id. at 1022 (“[I]n instances in which the challenged law has been
adopted through the initiative process there is a realistic risk that the public officials may not 
defend the approved initiative measure ‘with vigor.’ This enhanced risk is attributable to the 
unique nature and purpose of the initiative power, which gives the people the right to adopt into 
law measures that their elected officials have not adopted and may often oppose.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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As a consequence, California courts have routinely permitted the 
official proponents of an initiative to intervene or appear as real 
parties in interest to defend a challenged voter-approved initiative 
measure in order “to guard the people’s right to exercise initiative 
power.”85 
Perry III acknowledged that, despite the above case law and the 
policy argument, initiatives’ official proponents may be flawed 
defenders of their initiatives. Proponents’ legal arguments “are not 
always the strongest or most persuasive . . . regarding the validity or 
proper interpretation of the initiative . . . .”86 Still, “[s]uch 
participation by the official initiative proponents enhances both the 
substantive fairness and completeness of the judicial evaluation and 
the appearance of procedural fairness . . . .”87 
Moreover, constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the 
initiative process give proponents a “distinct” and “unique” role, 
which led to the proponents being “the most logical and appropriate 
choice to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the initiative 
measure . . . .”88 Indeed, “it would be an abuse of discretion to 
preclude the official proponents from intervening to defend a 
challenged initiative measure when the named government 
defendants have declined to defend the initiative measure.”89 
Importantly, proponents’ right to intervene should be recognized, 
even when the government defendants are defending the initiative: 
“there is a realistic risk that the public officials may not defend the 
approved initiative measure with vigor.”90 
The California Supreme Court concluded, “The initiative power 
would be significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the 
state’s interest in the validity of the measure when elected officials 
85. Id. at 1006. The Court acknowledged that, with one exception (see Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of
S. Cal v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1986)), initiative proponents’ standing had not been
expressly countenanced by prior cases, because proponents’ roles—as real parties in interest or
amicus curiae—had never been challenged. Still, the Court noted, past cases permitting a
particular practice, even without challenge or analysis, “have much weight, as they show that the
asserted flaw in the procedure neither occurred to the bar nor the bench.” Perry III, 265 P.3d at
1145 (quoting Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)).
86. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1024.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1017–18, 1024.
89. Id. at 1023.
90. Id. at 1022 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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decline to defend it in court or to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure.”91 Accordingly,  
[e]ven though the official proponents of an initiative
measure are not public officials, the role they play in
asserting the state’s interest in the validity of an initiative
measure in this judicial setting does not threaten the
democratic process or the proper governance of the state,
but, on the contrary, serves to safeguard the unique
elements and integrity of the initiative process.92
E. Further Proceedings in the Ninth Circuit (Perry IV)
The Ninth Circuit accepted as binding the California Supreme 
Court’s determination that Proposition 8’s Official Proponents were 
“authori[zed] to represent the People’s interest in the initiative 
measure they sponsored.”93 The circuit court noted that when state 
officers are sued on behalf of a state, as a result of the Eleventh 
Amendment, either the officers or the state itself may appeal. While 
the decision to appeal is “most commonly made by state executive 
branch . . . the states need not follow that approach.”94 “It is their 
prerogative, as independent sovereigns, to decide for themselves who 
may assert their interests and under what circumstances, and to 
bestow that authority accordingly.”95 
Since proponents’ capacity “to bring this appeal on behalf of the 
State”96 was conclusive as a matter of state law, Article III standing 
was satisfied.97 
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Id. at 1030–31; see also id. at 1024 (Proponents’ ability to defend their initiatives, even
when state officials are also doing so, “is essential to ensure” that voters’ interests “are not 
consciously or unconsciously subordinated” by those officials.). Indeed, proponents’ rights to be 
co-defendants are as important as their rights to be sole defendants. When no official defense is 
mounted, the responsible officials may be identified and—at least in theory—held politically 
accountable for their inaction. On the other hand, accountability may dissipate when the public 
officials are able to claim that they defended the initiative—albeit, without vigor—and then 
blame courts for striking down the initiative. 
93. Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
94. Id. at 1052.
95. Id. at 1071.
96. Id. at 1064.
97. The Court of Appeal, like the California Supreme Court before it, failed to address
proponents’ lack of a particularized injury. Id. at 1074. 
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On the merits, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Walker, 
although on narrower grounds.98 Following denial of a rehearing en 
banc,99 proponents filed for certiorari. 
F. Proposition 8 in the Supreme Court and Afterward
In granting certiorari,100 the Supreme Court asked for briefing on 
petitioners’ standing. This issue then consumed much of the oral 
argument and served as the basis for the Court’s judgment. Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for a five-member majority, held that 
petitioners lacked standing. That judgment vacated the decision of 
the Ninth Circuit, but not that of the district court. As named 
defendants, state officials clearly had standing to defend the law in 
the trial court, so there was no defect in that court’s judgment.101 By 
leaving that judgment intact, the Supreme Court implicitly held the 
failure of state defendants to mount a defense did not deprive the 
district court of jurisdiction.102 However, in the Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court, no state officials appealed; only the initiative’s 
proponents did so. This fact, the Supreme Court ruled, deprived the 
appellate courts of jurisdiction. 
The ultimate fate of Proposition 8 was unclear for a while. On 
the same day the Supreme Court decided Hollingsworth, the 
California State Registrar issued a letter to all county clerks in 
California directing them to start issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples.103 Proponents then filed for a Writ of Mandate in 
the California Supreme Court, asserting that the district court 
judgment extended only to the two counties whose clerks had been 
named as defendants.104 The California Supreme Court rejected this 
theory.105 As a result, Proposition 8 was effectively nullified. 
98. Id. at 1064.
99. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 592 F.3d 971 (2009).
100. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
101. See generally Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and
the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 831 (2004) (named 
defendants have both the right and obligation to defend). 
102. This may be a problematic outcome. While parties who are sued ordinarily have standing
to defend, the case might not otherwise be justifiable. See infra, note 213. 
103. Letter from Tony Agurto, State Registrar of Cal., to County Clerks and County
Recorders (June 26, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/Letter_to_County_Officials.pdf. 
104. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate Stay or Injunctive Relief at 43,
Hollingsworth v. O’Connell, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6809 (Cal. Aug. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HollingsworthMandamusAction.pdf. Counties and other political 
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Windsor also left state marriage bans in limbo. While Justice 
Kennedy’s decision invalidating DOMA was based on respect for the 
states’ right to define marriage without federal interference, several 
lower courts and state officials began to extend Windsor to state laws 
soon after the decision.106 
The uncertainty created by the contrast between the holdings on 
standing in Windsor and Hollingsworth is not dissipated by the 
Court's decision in Obergefell, finding a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage. It also relates to the continued vitality of direct 
democracy—the power of the people to create, amend, and repeal 
state law through the initiative. Addressing that problem is the 
primary purpose of this Article. 
IV. DECONSTRUCTING HOLLINGSWORTH
A. Initiative Proponents’ Standing:
Framing the Analysis 
Prior to Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court had only once before 
considered the standing of initiative proponents to defend their 
efforts in federal court. In Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona,107 voters adopted an initiative constitutional amendment 
that declared English as the official language of Arizona. In a federal 
suit brought by a state employee, the district court ruled that the 
initiative violated the First Amendment, but denied the employee 
relief since she could not show that any enforcement threats had been 
made against her.108 The court also dismissed all state defendants on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds except for the governor. The 
governor, however, indicated she would not appeal the judgment 
invalidating the initiative.109 The district court then denied the 
initiative’s proponents’ post-judgment motion to intervene to 
subdivisions of a state do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, so they can be named as 
defendants in their political capacities. 
105. Hollingsworth v. O’Connell, S211990, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 6809 (Cal. Aug. 14, 2013); see
also Letter from Kamala Harris, Attorney Gen., to The Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Jr., 
Governor of the State of Cal. (June 3, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AG_Letter.pdf 
(stating that the injunction, if it were to go into effect, would apply statewide.). 
106. This was done mostly on the basis of the Windsor majority’s reliance on Due Process
and Equal Protection principles. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Miller, 983 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D. Vt. 2013); 
Dep’t of Health v. Hanes, 78 A.3d 676 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). 
107. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 49 (1997).
108. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 317 (D. Ariz. 1990).
109. Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D. Ariz. 1990).
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defend.110 On cross-appeals by the employee and the proponents, the 
Ninth Circuit observed that proponents could intervene on appeal 
only if they independently satisfied Article III standing.111 The court 
held that they did, by analogizing them to state legislators who have 
been recognized in appropriate circumstances as proper parties to 
defend their legislative actions.112 
The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court: 
We have recognized that state legislators have standing to 
contest a decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if 
state law authorizes legislators to represent the State’s 
interests. [Proponents] however, are not elected 
representatives, and we are aware of no Arizona law 
appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of 
Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the 
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State. Nor 
has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as 
Article-III-qualified defenders of the measures they 
advocated.113 
Although expressing “grave doubts” about proponents’ 
standing,114 the Supreme Court declined to decide the issue, holding 
instead that the case was moot since the complaining employee had 
resigned her state position. Confusingly, in discussing the district 
court’s jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg wrote that initiative proponents 
“had an arguable basis for seeking appellate review.”115 
110. Id.
111. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 68 (1986)) (“‘[A]lthough intervenors are considered parties entitled, among other things, 
to seek review . . . an intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose 
side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the 
requirements of Art. III.’ This requirement assures the jurisdictional prerequisite of a live ‘case or 
controversy.’”). 
112. Id. at 733 (“AOE argues that as the principal sponsor of the initiative, it stands in an
analogous position to a state legislature. We agree.”). 
113. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 66. At another point in her decision, Justice Ginsburg wrote that proponents “had
an arguable basis for seeking appellate review.” Id. at 74. 
115. Id. at 74. Elsewhere, Justice Ginsburg faulted the lower courts for not certifying to the
Arizona Supreme Court the substantive interpretation of the challenged initiative. Id. at 62–63. 
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Perhaps the most that can be said for Arizonans as precedent116 
is that, absent specific state authority, initiative proponents lack 
standing to assert either the state’s interest or their own “legislative” 
interest on appeal. That is at least how lower courts have read the 
case.117 
Thus, when the same standing issue arose in Perry II, the Ninth 
Circuit asked the California Supreme Court if proponents had the 
specific state authority found lacking in Arizonans.118 In formulating 
its question to the California Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit may 
have had the legislative standing aspect of Arizonans in mind.119 The 
question was expressed in two parts: “Whether under Article II, 
Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under 
California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure 
possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or 
the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s 
validity . . . .”120 
California Constitution Article II, Section 8 sets forth the 
initiative power, which the California Supreme Court has repeatedly 
described as legislative in character.121 Thus, when asking whether 
proponents had a “particularized interest” under California law, the 
Ninth Circuit was likely asking about proponents’ role in the 
initiative process, and corresponding status, rather than about other 
legal injuries they might have suffered (for which a certified question 
would have been unnecessary).122 
In further explaining its first prong, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly 
referred to the “particularized state-law interest” that proponents 
might have.123 The terminology employed by the court echoed that 
116. Later courts have characterized Arizonans’ discussion of standing as dicta. See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 
1198 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (“obiter dictum”). 
117. See, e.g., Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood v.
Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998). 
118. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1193.
119. Id. (“[I]n light of [Arizonans,] it is critical that we be advised of [proponents’] rights
under California law.”). 
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. See infra, Part IV.D.2.
122. Had the standing question related to proponents’ non-state law injuries, the Ninth Circuit
could have resolved that core Article III question without certifying the issue to the California 
Supreme Court. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (holding that a 
federal court must decide whether a party has standing under federal law). 
123. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added).
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which it used in its Arizonans opinion in describing initiative 
proponents’ standing as legislators.124 Given that Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt authored Arizonans at the Ninth Circuit, and was on the 
Perry II panel,125 when formulating its certified question the panel 
may have been referring back to Judge Reinhardt’s holding in 
Arizonans that initiative proponents possessed legislative standing—
a holding that was questioned but not foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court in its Arizonans’ opinion. This interpretation of the Ninth 
Circuit’s first prong is also consistent with the rest of its opinion in 
Perry II recounting the many California state court decisions 
describing the initiative power as a legislative power superior to that 
of the Legislature.126 
The Ninth Circuit saw proponents’ standing in the alternative; 
either because they had a particularized injury under California law 
or because they could assert the state’s interest. Under the second 
prong, proponents would not need a particularized injury of their 
own, but could simply act as “agents of the People, in lieu of public 
officials who refuse to do so.”127 
In Perry III, the California Supreme Court reframed the Ninth 
Circuit’s first question and, in doing so, started down a different 
path. It stated the question as whether “official proponents may have 
their own personal ‘particularized’ interest in the initiative’s 
validity.”128 It repeated the modifier “personal” several times,129 even 
124. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The official sponsors of a ballot
initiative have a strong interest in the vitality of a provision of the state constitution which they 
proposed and for which they vigorously campaigned . . . . Arizona law recognizes the ballot 
initiative sponsor's heightened interest in the measure by giving the sponsor official rights and 
duties distinct from those of the voters at large . . . the added interest necessary to confer Article 
III standing—a particularized injury that distinguishes AOE from ‘concerned bystanders,’ 
Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62—is present here.”). 
125. Judge Reinhardt joined the per curiam Order and filed a separate concurrence where he
criticized the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine and the parties for creating an avoidable 
standing problem. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1200–01. 
126. The Ninth Circuit continues to treat “the initiative power [in California as] a legislative
power. And rightly so,” concluding that “it is more like legislation.” Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs 
& Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion regarding Arizona law. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 5–6 (U.S. June 29, 2015). The initiative power in 
California is uniquely protected from interference by the Legislature. See Perry II, 628 F.3d at 
1197 n.4. 
127. Id. at 1197.
128. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1011 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added).
129. The court also referred to “proponents’ own particularized personal interest” and
“proponents’ own personal interests.” Id. at 1019, 1022. 
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though the Ninth Circuit never used that term. And despite lengthy 
citations to Article III standing cases, including Arizonans, the 
California court found it unnecessary to answer the Ninth Circuit’s 
first prong.130 Instead—as noted in Part III above—it found it 
sufficient to answer the second prong, holding that “proponents of 
[an] initiative are authorized under California law to appear and 
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity.”131 
The California Supreme Court in Perry III recognized Official 
Proponents “quasi-legislative interest in defending the 
constitutionality of the measure,”132 drawing significant support from 
Karcher v. May,133 a case involving legislative standing. However, 
the court seems to have viewed legislative standing as a subset of 
representational standing (on behalf of the state),134 rather than as a 
species of proponents’ own “particularized interest.”135 That might 
explain why the court answered only the second prong of the 
certified question. However, assuming that proponents can assert a 
form of legislative standing—a matter more fully discussed in 
Section D below—it seems important to place it in the right category, 
either representational, on behalf of the state, or on their own behalf, 
based on proponents’ status as quasi-legislators. 
Those are the two prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s certified 
question. Which one better describes proponents of a state initiative 
might have been important in Hollingsworth. However, following the 
California Supreme Court’s lead, the point was not fully addressed 
by Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion. He found that: a) 
proponents lacked any personal injury of their own, and b) could not 
130. Id. at 1015.
131. Id. at 1007 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1013.
133. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
134. See, Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1013 (Cal. 2011) (“[L]ogic suggests that
a state should have the power to determine who is authorized to assert the state’s own interest in 
defending a challenged state law.”) (citing Karcher) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1025 
(concluding that proponents may “assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity and to 
appeal a judgment invalidating the measure”). 
135. See id. at 1021 (“[O]ne may question whether the official proponents of a successful
initiative measure, any more than legislators who have introduced and successfully shepherded a 
bill through the legislative process, can properly claim any distinct or personal legally protected 
stake in the measure once it is enacted into law.”). 
2015] STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES 1093 
represent the state of California.136 But, like the court in Perry III, he 
did not discuss proponents’ possible legislative standing under either 
prong. At least in retrospect, that may have been proponents’ 
strongest argument. 
Was the California Supreme Court correct to treat proponents’ 
possible quasi-legislative status as representing the state under the 
second prong? We think the court was in error, but recognize that the 
mistake might not have been entirely of that court’s own making. 
Instead, the confusion may stem from Justice O’Connor’s 1987 
opinion in Karcher v. May.137 
In Karcher, Alan Karcher and Carmen Orechio, in their official 
capacities as the state general assembly speaker and state senate 
president, intervened in district court to defend the constitutionality 
of New Jersey’s moment-of-silence statute after the state attorney 
general declined to defend it.138 The Court ruled that Karcher and 
Orechio had Article III standing to defend the statute. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted applications of 
the Speaker of the General Assembly and the President of 
the Senate to intervene as parties-respondent on behalf of 
the legislature in defense of a legislative enactment. . . . 
Since the New Jersey Legislature had authority under state 
law to represent the State’s interests in both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals, we need not 
vacate the judgments below for lack of a proper 
defendant-appellant.139 
The quoted language creates an ambiguity. The first sentence 
describes the named legislators as representing the New Jersey 
“legislature.” The second sentence describes the legislature as 
representing the “State.” Are these the same—legislature and state? 
In some contexts the answer is yes, such as in suits against states, 
where the “state’s” sovereign immunity can be waived only by the 
legislature.140 But in legislative standing cases the answer appears to 
be no. Indeed, in most such cases the legislature has taken a position 
136. The state was undoubtedly injured by the district court’s invalidation of state law and
was entitled to assert that injury through a representative. But, as we discuss in Part IV.C infra, 
the Court held that only elected officials can represent the state in federal court. 
137. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 82 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
140. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1996).
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adverse to executive officials (who ordinarily represent “the state” in 
litigation) and are often formally opposing parties.141 At the very 
least, then, different branches or entities of a “state” may have 
distinct interests, each of which gives rise to Article III standing.142 
Is the “state” a unitary entity for Article III purposes? If 
legislators can represent only the state’s interest, rather than their 
own, the state would then have two opposing representatives—
legislative and executive.143 A legion of separation-of-powers cases 
suggest that these branches often have distinct and adverse interests 
sufficient to create a case or controversy for federal court.144 
Accordingly, to the extent that initiative proponents, and legislators 
generally, have standing to defend their enactments, it may be 
because they have their own “particularized interests” that are 
distinct from the state’s interests (at least as framed by the executive 
branch).145 In sum, the equivalence created by Justice O’Connor in 
Karcher may be conceptually problematic.146 
141. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
142. The notion that separate entities within a state must speak with a unified voice was
implicitly rejected in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Ind. Red. Comm’n, 576 U.S. __ (2015), 
in that two state entities—the legislature and the independent redistricting commission—were 
adverse, yet the Supreme Court held the legislature had standing and then adjudicated the dispute. 
Id. at 2–3. See also Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, where the Court held 
that “a federal court [may] adjudicate a dispute between [a state’s] components” despite the fact 
that “the opposing parties are both creatures of the Commonwealth.” 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1640–41 
(2011) (Scalia, J.); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s 
Sponsors, Blag, and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 167 (2013) 
(describing the state’s split interest as “double dipping” for standing purposes). 
143. In Perry III, the California Supreme Court found it unremarkable that different state
entities may have different views and take opposing positions in litigation. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 
1025–28 (and cases cited therein). But neither Perry III nor its cited cases involved federal 
standing. 
144. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. 919; U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t
Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d U.S. Dep’t Commerce v. U.S. House of 
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999). Even if a state legislature and governor are not in direct 
conflict, a legislature’s distinct interest may be a basis for the legislature’s own standing. See 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
1047, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2014), cert. granted __U.S. __ (2014) (a state legislature has standing to 
challenge, under U. S. CONST., art I, § 4, cl. 1, an independent redistricting commission which 
was enacted by popular initiative, because the legislature “has demonstrated that its loss of 
redistricting power constitutes a concrete injury.”). 
145. This point is reinforced by the legislative standing cases discussed infra in Part IV.D,
which speak of legislators’ and legislature’s injuries as distinct from that of the broader 
government of which they are a part. 
146. Moreover, it was based on a misreading of New Jersey law. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey case cited by Justice O’Connor involved a different matter than was before the Court in 
Karcher. In In re Forsythe, the New Jersey court granted the Legislature’s motion to intervene on 
2015] STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES 1095 
Notwithstanding the above discussion, if Justice O’Connor was 
correct in Karcher, then legislators (and possibly quasi-legislators 
like proponents) are properly seen as representatives of the state. 
This would put initiative proponents under the second prong of the 
Ninth Circuit’s certified question, where they would need to establish 
their authority to represent the state. On the other hand, if the 
equivalence were false, then legislators—and quasi-legislators— 
would be representing their own “particularized interests” and fall 
under the Ninth Circuit’s first prong. To be sure, in either case, 
legislators would be suing or defending in their official capacities, 
rather than asserting an interest personal to themselves. 
Why does this subtle distinction matter? Because it goes to the 
unanswered question in Arizonans and suggests that the Court in 
Hollingsworth missed an opportunity to settle the issue of 
proponents’ “quasi-legislative” standing. It is also at the heart of the 
republican government vs. direct democracy subtext of 
Hollingsworth. If only elected state representatives can assert the 
state’s interest, and that is the only interest that has standing under 
Article III, then the people’s effort to reserve sovereign power to 
themselves via initiative will fail in federal court. 
Perry III’s reframing of proponents’ non-representational 
interest—in their personal rather than their quasi-legislative 
capacities—persisted throughout the remainder of the appeals, both 
at the Ninth Circuit147 and at the Supreme Court. Even proponents 
adopted this reframing by arguing in their brief only their standing 
based on their authority to represent the state. Accordingly, 
proponents’ legislative status, as a possible distinct basis for 
standing, disappeared from the case. 
We concede that our foregoing theory about Perry II—namely, 
that the Ninth Circuit’s first prong of “particularized interest” should 
the same side as the attorney general in defense of state law. 450 A.2d 499, 500 (N.J. 1982). 
Whether or not they were all “representing the state,” they were certainly joined in interest in that 
case. Id. In her amicus brief in Hollingsworth, Attorney General Harris also noted that Karcher’s 
“[r]eliance on Forsythe may have been misplaced.” Brief for the State of California as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 68, at 12 n.3. It should also be noted that had 
Forsythe been in federal court, the Legislature’s intervention might have been inappropriate if the 
state, as represented by the attorney general, already “adequately represent[ed] [the Legislature’s] 
interest.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
147. If the Ninth Circuit in Perry II had legislative standing in mind as a distinct theory, it did
not re-raise it anywhere in Perry IV. Judge Reinhardt also authored the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on 
the merits in Perry IV. Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1052. 
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be read to include legislative standing—may be incorrect. Perhaps 
the strongest argument that it is incorrect is that the Ninth Circuit in 
Perry IV could have clarified the matter, but did not do so. In other 
words, if the California Supreme Court in Perry III had erroneously 
failed to include legislative standing under the first prong, the Ninth 
Circuit in Perry IV could have pointed out the error; by not pointing 
out the “error,” perhaps the Ninth Circuit saw none. 
We return to the question of proponents’ quasi-legislative status 
in Section D below, where we treat it as a possible third prong of 
proponents’ standing. In the meantime, it is sufficient to observe that 
all the appellate courts, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit in 
Perry II—treated the first prong of the certified question as 
pertaining to proponents’ personal injuries, rather than their injuries 
as quasi-legislators. We follow that structure in Sections B and C 
below. 
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the five-justice majority in 
Hollingsworth,148 holding that the official proponents lacked 
standing to appeal the district court’s decision in Perry I and 
subsequently the Ninth Circuit’s Perry IV decision. The chief 
justice’s majority opinion began with a threshold principle of Article 
III standing: “standing in federal court is a question of federal law, 
not state law.”149 Using federal law, the majority then addressed the 
two prongs as reframed by the California Supreme Court. 
B. The First Prong: Proponents’ Particularized Injury
as Individuals 
Although the California Supreme Court did not answer the 
Ninth Circuit’s first question, even as reformulated by that court as 
one of personal injury, Chief Justice Roberts did. He first stated the 
familiar Article III rule—“To have standing, a litigant must seek 
relief for an injury that affects him in a ‘personal and individual 
way.’ He must possess a ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of the case.”150 
The primary test for standing in federal court is the requirement that 
plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is both “distinct and 
148. Joining the chief justice were Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia.
149. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013). This holding is not controversial.
The California Supreme Court in Perry III and the Hollingsworth dissent agreed: in federal court, 
standing is a matter of federal law. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1011; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, 2668 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
150. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
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palpable.”151 That requirement has been formulated in recent years as 
one of “concrete and particularized” injury.152 Plaintiff must be 
harmed in a unique way, as opposed to presenting only a 
“generalized grievance,” common to the public as a whole.153 
Moreover, the harm suffered, even if unique, must be one that is 
“cognizable” in federal court. The terms “cognizable,” “palpable,” 
and “concrete” have been used interchangeably over the years, but 
all enforce the same jurisprudential limit of “cases of a judiciary 
nature.”154 
Because the notion of proponents’ legislative standing had 
disappeared from the case, the majority focused on their “personal” 
injuries. It found them lacking. Rather, according to the majority, 
proponents had only a “generalized” interest in upholding 
Proposition 8. 
Here, . . . [the Official Proponents] had no “direct stake” in 
the outcome of their appeal. Their only interest in having 
the District Court order reversed was to vindicate the 
constitutional validity of a generally applicable California 
law. 
 We have repeatedly held that such a “generalized 
grievance,” no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer 
standing. A litigant  
raising only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him 
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III 
case or controversy.155 
151. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
153. Id. at 575.
154. This was the term that James Madison used in his notes to describe the scope of Article
III jurisdiction. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 430 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966). But whether an injury is “cognizable” is in the eyes of the beholder. The term often 
works to restrict standing when the Justices fail to appreciate the nature of plaintiff’s injury. See, 
e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148, 1151 (2013) (plaintiffs’ challenge to
surveillance by U.S. intelligence agencies was based on “highly speculative fear” that their
communications were being intercepted, and burdensome protective measures they undertook to
guard against interception were self-inflicted).
155. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662. Justice Roberts further noted, “the District Court [in
Perry I] had not ordered [proponents] to do or refrain from doing anything.” Id. 
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The notion that proponents’ personal stake in Proposition 8 was 
indistinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of 
California156 would be disputed by any initiative proponent. They 
might argue—and the Proposition 8 proponents did argue—that they 
“go to great lengths” in exercising their right to invoke the people’s 
sovereign right of direct democracy,157 putting their efforts, 
resources, reputations158 and political careers on the line to draft an 
initiative, gather signatures to qualify it for the ballot, and then 
campaign for its passage.159 They have taken unique risks, their 
views are likely to carry greater weight, and they have “a distinct 
role—involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from 
other supporters of the measure.”160 However, Chief Justice Roberts 
found that the interests of proponents were distinct and particularized 
only while an initiative was pending.161 Once it was adopted by the 
voters, proponents no longer had any special role in the process or 
any unique interests at stake. They were then like any other 
Californian. 
In sum, the Court in Hollingsworth did not recognize the 
peculiar personal injuries allegedly suffered by the initiative’s 
156. Id. at 2663.
157. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158. The reputational interests of proponents of controversial ballot initiatives were argued by
an initiative’s proponents in Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d 771 
F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). In Sevcik, the Coalition for the Protection of Marriage (“Coalition”) was
the official proponent of Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban. In seeking to intervene in a challenge
to that ban, the Coalition argued that it had personal standing, because, inter alia, its “reputational
interest” was at stake, in that the Coalition was accused of bigotry. See Coalition’s Motion to
Intervene at 13, Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (No. 12CV00578).
159. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate Stay or Injunctive Relief, supra
note 104, at 2, par. 6; see Kyle La Rose, The Injury-in-Fact Barrier to Initiative Proponent 
Standing: How Article III Might Prevent Federal Courts from Enforcing Direct Democracy, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1717, 1729 (2012); Thomas M. Messner, The Price of Prop 8, BACKGROUNDER 
(No. 2328) Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the 
-price-of-prop-8. The Proposition 8 proponents also claimed in the trial court that their personal
safety was compromised by their sponsorship and defense of the controversial initiative. See
Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for a Stay, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-02292); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 481 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (detailing threats to Proposition 8 proponents).
However, it is unclear whether any causal link—between the proponents’ personal safety and the
validity of Proposition 8—existed here. In any event, the proponents failed to raise their personal
safety (or any evidence of their alleged personal stake in proposition 8’s validity) before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
160. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 696 (9th Cir.
2014) (Graber, J., dissenting); id. at 679 (Bea, J., concurring). 
161. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
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sponsors. The Court seemed to hold generally that, as a matter of 
law, initiative proponents lack Article III standing as individuals. 
Regardless of whether this result is a proper reading of Article III, 
Proposition 8’s proponents’ inability to “articulate even one specific 
harm they may suffer . . . .”162 contributed to their failure to satisfy 
Perry II’s first prong under the Supreme Court’s current standing 
jurisprudence.163 
C. The Second Prong: Proponents’ Standing
as Representatives 
In the Supreme Court, proponents’ asserted basis for standing 
was that the California Supreme Court in Perry III had confirmed 
their “authority under state law . . . to defend Proposition 8 as agents 
of the people of California in lieu of public officials who refuse to do 
so.”164 The Hollingsworth majority disagreed. They held that the 
constitutional and statutory provisions relied upon by the state’s high 
court were limited to “enacting” the initiative. Thus, rejecting the 
California Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, the majority 
concluded that once Proposition 8 was passed by the voters, the 
proponents “ha[d] no role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement 
of Proposition 8.”165 We question this conclusion. 
First, we note that the Hollingsworth majority seemed to suggest 
that they had a better understanding of California initiative law than 
the state Supreme Court. This is a remarkable proposition, especially 
coming from the drafter of the majority opinion, the chief justice, 
162. Perry I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. In contrast to the Hollingsworth proponents, the
proponents of the Nevada initiative banning same-sex marriage proffered several individual and 
particularized interests in upholding the ban, including: (a) the Coalition’s “reputational 
interests,” supra note 153, at 13, and (b) the Coalition’s members’ associational and religious 
liberty interests in having a “marriage” undiluted by being broadly defined to include same-sex 
couples. Coalition’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 153, at 14–15. It is doubtful whether any of 
the Nevada proponents’ personal standing arguments would survive the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent holding in Hollingsworth. 
163. A detailed explanation of personal standing jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
Article. A comprehensive overview can be found in Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the 
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1915 (1986). 
164. See Brief of Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-
144) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
165. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663. Indeed, the majority seemed to imply that, once
Proposition 8 passed, the proponents—regardless of “how deeply committed” or “zealous” they 
remain—are only “concerned bystanders.” Id. 
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who has been a staunch advocate of states’ rights federalism.166 
Ordinarily, how a state structures its own government and internal 
processes is conclusively a matter for state law, as authoritatively 
construed by the state Supreme Court.167 This rule also applies to the 
core Article III question of party standing. That is why, for instance, 
the Supreme Court in Arizonans cited to the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey’s grant of intervention in Karcher but was unable to resolve 
proponents’ standing under Arizona law.168 It was also the basis for 
the dissent in Hollingsworth. As Justice Kennedy’s dissent put it, 
“the State Supreme Court’s definition of proponents’ powers is 
binding on this Court. And that definition is fully sufficient to 
establish . . . standing.”169 The California Supreme Court was of a 
similar view: “It is not for a federal court to tell a state who may 
appear on its behalf any more than it is for Congress to direct state 
law-enforcement officers to administer a federal regulatory 
scheme.”170 
But even given the chief justice’s contrary reading of California 
law—that proponents did not qualify under state law to serve as 
representatives—we think he distorted the rule on representational 
standing; namely, whether the “Official Proponents” of an initiative 
can represent the people’s interest when executive officials decline to 
do so. We think there were three errors in the chief justice’s 
approach to this question: (1) he wrongly held that representatives of 
an injured party must have standing in their own right; (2) he 
discarded state law and developed a federal common law rule that 
representatives must be “agents” of the party they represent; and (3) 
he conflated the constructs of “the State” and “the People,” thus 
failing to appreciate that in exercising the power of initiative, 
sovereignty is reposed in the voters, not the established state 
government. 
166. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21
ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 511 (2011). 
167. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011); see also Perry
v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d at 1070 (and cases cited therein); see also Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 27 (U.S. June 29, 2015).
168. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (“[W]e are aware
of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona.”). 
169. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
170. Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1072 (internal quotations omitted).
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1. Representative Standing Is Based on the Party
Represented, Not the Representative 
Hollingsworth’s first basis for rejecting the Official Proponents 
as representatives of the state was that, even where litigants are 
allowed “to assert the interests of others, the litigants themselves still 
must have suffered an injury in fact . . . .”171 
We believe that this requirement lacks validity. The majority 
seems to have confused representational standing with the separate 
issue of jus tertii or “third-party” standing. Jus tertii allows a litigant, 
who otherwise meets the standing requirements of Article III (e.g., 
has suffered her own particularized injury), to assert not her own 
interests but those of a third-party.172 Justice Roberts’ statement 
correctly describes the law of jus tertii standing as it relates to 
“other” (usually absent) parties. But it is different than 
representational standing, where the named litigant need not have an 
injury of her own, but acts on behalf of the injured party. In 
Hollingsworth, proponents claimed they stepped into the shoes of 
state executive officials when the latter chose not to defend 
Proposition 8 in the district court and then chose not to appeal that 
court’s Perry I judgment. In other words, they were acting on behalf 
of the injured party (the People or the State) for purposes of 
appealing the decision in Perry I. 
The Court does not usually ask whether state officials are proper 
jus terii champions to assert a state’s interests. If it did, most such 
cases could not get into federal court since officials seldom have a 
personal injury of their own. Nor should have it done so in 
Hollingsworth.173 By contrast, representational standing, by 
definition, allows a litigant to represent someone else, without regard 
to the litigant’s own injury. Examples of such representational 
171. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663.
172. This was the issue in the case—Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)—that Justice
Roberts cited for disallowing the official proponents legislative standing. See Hollingsworth, 133 
S. Ct. at 2663. In Diamond, a private physician had sought to defend an Illinois law restricting
abortion rights. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 54. He had no connection to the state law other than as a
concerned citizen. Id. at 64. The Hollingsworth proponents did not claim standing on that basis.
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664.
173. Even if it were germane to proponents’ standing, jus tertii is a prudential doctrine, not
constitutionally required. As such, “weighty countervailing policies” create exceptions to the rule, 
such as where rights holders “have no effective avenue of preserving their rights themselves.” 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444–46 
(1972). 
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standing can be found in qui tam and “next friend” actions and where 
a special prosecutor is allowed to stand in for the government in 
criminal proceedings. 
In Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens,174 the Court found that a relator had standing to bring a 
False Claims Act action on behalf of the United States, despite the 
fact that the relator himself had no “concrete private interest in the 
outcome of the suit.”175 The Court analogized the relator to an 
assignee of a claim, a form of representational standing that the 
Court has long recognized.176 Because the United States had suffered 
injury, the relator had standing to assert it.177 
In Hollingsworth, Chief Justice Roberts distinguished Stevens on 
the basis of the ancient tradition that supports qui tam actions. The 
chief justice held that this form of representational standing was 
implicitly incorporated into Article III. Yet that was only an 
alternative “confirming” basis for the Court’s holding in Stevens.178 
He provided the same historical explanation for another form of 
representational standing—“next friend” status.179 Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent correctly viewed these histories as irrelevant to the Article III 
question.180 Even if the jurisdiction of federal courts were confined 
to “matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at 
Westminster,”181 the broader category of representative lawsuits 
would still be well within Article III. 
The Supreme Court has allowed other non-officials to be 
designated to represent the government. An example of such a 
designation is that of a special prosecutor, a process that the 
174. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
175. Id. at 787. Although Justices Stevens and Souter dissented on the merits, the Court was
unanimous that relators in qui tam actions had standing to sue on behalf of the government. Id. at 
793–94 (Stevens, J., and Souter, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 773.
177. Id. at 774. But see Myriam Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and
the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 338 (2001) (qui tam actions lie only 
for injuries to the government in its proprietary, not sovereign, capacity). However, the point is 
not that Official Proponents can maintain a qui tam action on behalf of the state, but only that the 
Supreme Court has long recognized representational standing without requiring the relator to 
have personally been injured. 
178. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775 (2000). The
common law tradition of qui tam actions “confirmed” Justice Scalia’s earlier conclusion, as well 
as the theory for, relator’s standing as “assignee” of the government’s claim. 
179. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1989)).
180. Id. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 774.
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Supreme Court upheld in Morrison v. Olson.182 The Hollingsworth 
majority acknowledged special prosecutors’ “independence,” but 
distinguished them by noting that they are “subject to the ultimate 
authority of the court that appointed them.”183 
Yet, the Hollingsworth proponents were similarly authorized by 
a court, in Perry III, to represent the state of California. Accordingly, 
there was no absent third party—and, therefore, no need for the 
proponents to show their own injury, as in jus tertii cases—since 
proponents were authorized to act on behalf of the state for the 
purpose of defending Proposition 8 in federal court.184 
2. A State’s Choice of Representatives Should be
Governed by State Law, Not by the Restatement of Agency 
The more important question raised by the Hollingsworth 
majority is whether and how an initiative’s proponents can be 
authorized to represent the state, even apart from their own injury (or 
lack of injury). The Hollingsworth proponents argued that they could 
rely on Perry III, in which the California Supreme Court expressly 
held that Official Proponents had the same status as elected state 
officials to defend Proposition 8 on behalf of the state. In other 
words, California continued to be the real party in interest, just as it 
would had the governor, attorney general, or another named 
defendant prosecuted the appeal. Under this theory, proponents were 
authorized “to act ‘as agents of the people’ of California.” 
The Hollingsworth majority disagreed, stating, “All that the 
California Supreme Court decision [in Perry III] stands for is that, so 
far as California is concerned, [the Official Proponents] may argue in 
defense of proposition 8.”185 However, Hollingsworth continued, the 
182. 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). The employment of special counsel is also an ancient practice.
For instance, the English government historically employed private barristers to represent the 
Crown in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, there were few public prosecutors until the Prosecution 
of Offenses Act in 1985 (1985 Chapter 23) established the Crown Prosecution Service. See 
Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 
672 (2009) (describing transition from “private prosecutions” to the crown following adoption of 
the Prosecution of Offenses Act). 
183. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2665.
184. See Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“The requirements of 
third-party standing, however, are beside the point: the State of California is no more a ‘third 
party’ relative to Proponents than it is to the executive officers of the State who ordinarily assert 
the State’s interest in litigation.”). 
185. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2666.
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Official Proponents did not become “de facto public officials” and 
did not become “agents of the State, formal or otherwise.”186 
“Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular 
interest.”187 
According to the Hollingsworth majority, Article III standing on 
behalf of a state is proper only in an “agent,” although no authority 
was cited for that limiting requirement. Agency thus becomes a 
matter of federal law, at least for standing purposes—superseding 
any contrary state law—thereby justifying the Court in rejecting 
California law with regard to proponents’ official status. Having 
established “agency” as a requirement for standing, Hollingsworth 
then went on to create a federal common law of agency for Article 
III. Per the Restatement of Agency, “an essential element . . . is the
principal’s right to control the agent’s actions,” but the Official
Proponents “answer to no one; they decide for themselves what
arguments to make and how to make them.”188
The Official Proponents are “not . . . elected at all. No provision 
provides for their removal. [T]he proponents apparently have an 
unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders 
of the initiative, however and to whatever extent they choose to 
defend it.”189 
Again, per the Restatement of Agency, “the agent owes a 
fiduciary obligation to the principal. But [the Official Proponents] 
owe nothing of the sort to the people of California.”190 
The Official Proponents “are free to pursue a purely ideological 
commitment to the law’s constitutionality without the need to take 
cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or 
potential ramifications for other state priorities.”191 
Applying these principles, the majority concluded that the 
proponents “plainly do not qualify as [agents of the State] . . . [N]o 
matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should 
have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot 
override our settled law to the contrary.”192 
186. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2666–67.
190. Id. at 2667.
191. Id. at 2667 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id.
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As a threshold matter, the Court’s use of agency law to 
determine standing is inapposite in the case of direct democracy, a 
matter discussed below.193 Also, the Restatement of Agency—which 
was the source of the majority’s discussion—is primarily a 
compilation of the fifty states’ common law. Accordingly, it is odd to 
rely on a general compendium of state law (namely, the Restatement) 
and ignore state law that is directly on point (namely, Perry III).194 
Moreover, the Hollingsworth majority—and the dissent—failed 
to consider existing federal precedent concerning the intersection of 
state law and Article III standing. For example, in Elk Grove Unified 
School District v. Newdow,195 the question of whether a father could 
sue in federal court on behalf of his minor child—in that case, to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance—turned 
on whether the state court, in a family law proceeding, granted the 
father the right to assert his daughter’s legal rights.196 Likewise, who 
may represent a corporation in federal court turns on the relevant 
state’s corporate statutes.197 Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(b), which is titled “Capacity to Sue or be Sued,” consistently 
refers to state law in determining capacity.198 
We assume that limits do exist as to whom a state may designate 
to stand in for a party in federal court. For example, it is doubtful that 
even the Hollingsworth dissent would allow California—whether by 
express statute or by judicial decision—to grant every one of the 
state’s 39 million residents the right to represent California in 
193. See infra, Part IV.C.3.
194. While this does not create an Erie problem (cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)), it does recall the “mischievous results” (id. at 74) of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), 
allowing unwritten “general law” to preempt state law on point. 
195. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
196. Id. at 17–18 (2004) (“We conclude that, having been deprived under California law of
the right to sue as next friend, [the father] lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal 
court.”); see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1975) (A divorced mother’s right to 
child support awarded to her under state law conferred Article III standing on her when she 
alleged that a termination of that support violated the U.S. Constitution.). 
197. Aarona v. Unity House Inc., CV. NO. 05-00197 DAE/BMK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47979, at *7–8 (D. Haw. July 2, 2007); Sanderling, Inc. v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 743, 751 (1976). 
198. Under Federal Rules Civil Procedure 17(b)(2) and 17(b)(3), a corporation’s capacity is
determined “by the law under which it was organized,” and “all other parties[’]” capacity is 
determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Accordingly, federal courts 
routinely look to state law in determining who are proper parties, including who are proper public 
parties. See, e.g., Finch v. Miss. State Med. Assoc., 585 F.2d 765, 774 n.11 (5th Cir. 1978) (“In 
the case of a public official, such as a governor, it is clear that capacity to sue is determined by 
the law of the state.”). 
1106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069 
defending an initiative in federal court. In other words, some Article 
III limits exist on a state’s ability to confer standing to act on the 
state’s behalf. 
What are those limits? Where is the line between where a state 
has the ability to decide who has standing (e.g., Elk Grove) and 
where a state lacks this ability (e.g., the “citizen suit” hypothetical 
above)? Hollingsworth holds that a state may not designate initiative 
proponents as the state’s representatives, but fails to otherwise 
illuminate how far a state’s Elk Grove-type authority extends. 
Regardless of this broad issue, the specific holding in 
Hollingsworth weighs heavily in limiting states’ own ability to create 
and apply the law of agency, including the identity of a state’s own 
agents. Indeed, by rejecting California’s choice of who may 
represent its interests, the Supreme Court does more than just 
displace state law with federal common law.199 It denigrates the 
state’s sovereignty by interfering with internal structural matters.200 
3. In Initiative Cases, the “Master,” for Purposes of
Representative Standing and Agency, Is “the People,”
and Not the Government Establishment 
The Hollingsworth proponents styled themselves as representing 
“the People” of California.201 So did the Ninth Circuit202 and 
California Supreme Court.203 While Chief Justice Roberts noted that 
formulation, he apparently did not appreciate the distinction between 
the “people” and the “state” with regard to initiatives. Instead his 
opinion primarily discussed whether proponents were “agents of the 
State” or “agents of California.”204 In contrast, the dissent made 
much of the distinction reflected in the nomenclature. “The essence 
199. Of course, the Court may do this when interpreting the Constitution, including Article
III. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
200. Cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011) (State may
decide for itself that a state agency has legal capacity to sue the state.); Ariz. State Legislature v. 
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 27 (U.S. June 29, 2015) (“[I]t is 
characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to establish their own 
governmental processes.”) (citations omitted). 
201. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/12-144_Brief_of_Petitioners.pdf; Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), passim. 
202. Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191 passim.
203. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002 passim (Cal. 2011).
204. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Neither the California Supreme Court nor
the Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents as agents of the State.”). 
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of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people and 
flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides 
first in the people without need of a grant from government.”205 
This was the revolutionary concept of popular sovereignty 
embodied in the United States Constitution. As James Madison noted 
in Federalist No. 46, “federal and State governments are in fact but 
different agents and trustees of the people . . . ultimate authority, 
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people 
alone.”206 This is, of course, reinforced by the opening words of the 
preamble, “[w]e the people . . . .”207 
The distinction between “people” and “state,” which may seem 
overly formalistic at first, goes to the heart of direct democracy and 
the motivating purpose of the initiative process. The foundational 
distinction between “the people” and “the State” was embodied in 
California’s original constitution and remains a centerpiece of 
initiative law today. “All political power is inherent in the people. 
Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good 
may require.”208 This was a common precept of popular sovereignty 
in the 19th Century. When enacting a state constitutional amendment 
by initiative, the “people” withdraw the power they had previously 
delegated to their institutional government, and reclaim it for 
themselves. Thus, the state constitution “speaks of the initiative and 
referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power 
reserved by them.”209 
To hold, as Hollingsworth does, that only “elected state 
officials” may represent the state’s interest, reverses the hierarchy of 
power. Put in terms of agency law, initiative proponents are not 
agents of the state; rather, they are the principal, and the established 
state is their agent.210 
205. Id. at 2675. See also Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 18.
206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
207. Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 24 (“[T]he animating principle of our Constitution [is]
that the people themselves are the originating source of all the powers of government.”); id. at 30. 
208. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (derived from U.S. CONST. art. I, §2 (amended 1849)).
209. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). A similar statement is in the Arizona
Constitution, where the Supreme Court found that the initiative is a legislative power. Ariz. State 
Legislature, slip op. at 5–6. 
210. In her amicus brief supporting respondents in the Supreme Court, Attorney General
Harris argued that only elected state officials had standing because they “are more likely to reflect 
the public support, or lack thereof, for a particular law.” Brief for the State of Cal. as Amicus 
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This difference between republican government and direct 
democracy is well noted in California history and case law. As 
recounted in Perry III: 
“[t]he initiative was viewed as one means of restoring the 
people’s rightful control over their government, by 
providing a method that would permit the people to propose 
and adopt statutory provisions and constitutional 
amendments.” The primary purpose of the initiative was to 
afford the people the ability to propose and to adopt 
constitutional amendments or statutory provisions that their 
elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt. 
The 1911 ballot pamphlet argument in favor of the measure 
described the initiative as “that safeguard which the people 
should retain for themselves, to supplement the work of the 
legislature by initiating those measures which the 
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to 
enact.211 
So, to ask whether initiative proponents are “agents” of the 
institutional state, as Chief Justice Roberts does, completely upends 
the governance framework in California and, presumably, that of 
other direct democracy states.212 It might be germane to ask instead 
whether proponents can act as agents of the “people” acting directly 
in their sovereign capacity, ignoring the established state structure in 
the instance. But Hollingsworth did not inquire into that question. 
D. The Missing Third Prong: Proponents’
Particularized Injury as Legislators
Finally, we consider whether a third prong exists: do an 
initiative’s proponents have Article III standing analogous to that of 
legislators? This may be what the Ninth Circuit intended by its first 
certified question, which then was altered by later courts and by 
proponents themselves. 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 68, at 18. Whatever merit that statement has with 
regard to ordinary legislation, it does not apply to initiative measures. 
211. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
212. See Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 28 (“Through the structure of its government, and
the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”). 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, continuing the distinction he made in Hollingsworth between the 
institutional legislature and the people’s legislative power. Id. at 1–2 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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This legislative standing theory is based on a distinctive right of 
federal or state legislatures to defend the validity of statutes they 
have enacted, even if the executive branch refuses to defend them. In 
other words, legislatures have Article III standing rights, not 
necessarily to represent federal or state government, but to represent 
their own interests in “their” official actions. If initiative proponents 
are analogous to legislators, then perhaps they have Article III 
standing, even if they do not have standing as individuals (the first 
prong discussed above) or as representatives of the state (the second 
prong).213 
At the threshold, it is important to note that Article III may not 
be the only obstacle to legislative lawsuits. As Professors Grove and 
Devins argue,214 two distinct separation-of-powers concerns may 
disable Congress from defending federal law when the executive 
demurs. The “Take Care” clause215 and the requirement of 
Bicameralism216 suggest that Congress has no role in the 
enforcement of federal law, even more so when one house acts 
alone.217 But, these separation-of-powers principles are federal and 
thus may not apply to the standing of state legislators.218 
213. There may be a distinction between the standing of legislatures (suing as a body) and
legislators (suing individually, but in their official capacities), which we discuss at the end of Part 
IV.D.1.
214. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in
Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014). Apart from Professors Grove and Devins’ 
arguments over whether courts have articulated a proper constitutional basis for Congressional 
standing, Professor Nat Stern has questioned whether, under Supreme Court case law, 
Congressional standing exists at all. Nat Stern, The Deflection of Congressional Standing (2015) 
(forthcoming in the Pepperdine Law Review; manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2592045.). 
215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”). 
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
217. See also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1354 (2014) (arguing that constitutional structure forecloses standing by Congress). 
218. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 832 n.3 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“As the Court
explains, Coleman may well be distinguishable on the further ground that it involved a suit by 
state legislators that did not implicate either the separation-of-powers concerns raised in this case 
or corresponding federalism concerns (since the Kansas Supreme Court had exercised jurisdiction 
to decide a federal issue).”). 
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1. Legislative Standing Background
The first Supreme Court case on legislative standing was 
Coleman v. Miller,219 where the Court held that Kansas legislators 
had standing to challenge the lieutenant governor’s participation (as 
president of the state senate) in a vote to ratify the Child Labor 
Amendment. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter wrote that the legislators’ 
interest in the matter was no different from that of any other citizen. 
“The fact that these legislators are part of the ratifying mechanism 
while the ordinary citizen of Kansas is not, is wholly irrelevant to 
th[e standing] issue.”220 But the majority disagreed. “We think that 
these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in 
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”221 Subsequent cases 
have built upon Coleman, confirming the doctrine both for state 
legislators and members of Congress. 
A recent case that considered legislative standing is the 
companion to Hollingsworth, United States v. Windsor.222 Plaintiff 
Edith Windsor, the surviving spouse of a same-sex married couple, 
filed a federal lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of section 3 
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).223 That section 
defined marriage to exclude same-sex couples; this exclusion, in 
turn, had the effect of denying inheritance tax and other benefits to 
Ms. Windsor. By direction of President Obama, Attorney General 
Holder refused to defend DOMA’s constitutionality. The House of 
Representatives voted to have its long-standing Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group (BLAG)224 intervene in the lawsuit to defend the 
law. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor found it 
unnecessary to “decide whether BLAG would have standing to 
challenge the district court’s ruling and its affirmance in the Court of 
Appeals on BLAG’s own authority.”225 To Justice Kennedy, the 
Executive Branch’s agreement on the merits with Edith Windsor 
raised a different justiciability question—whether lack of 
adverseness deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction—but not a 
219. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
220. Id. at 464.
221. Id. at 438.
222. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
223. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
224. 2 U.S.C. § 130(f) (2012).
225. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
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question of standing.226 Because BLAG created the requisite 
adverseness, Article III allowed the Court to decide Windsor on the 
merits. The similarity between the postures of Windsor and 
Hollingsworth caused Justice Kennedy to dissent in the latter on the 
standing issue. But three of the four justices who joined him in 
Windsor disagreed with him in Hollingsworth, instead voting that 
initiative proponents did not have standing. 
Indeed, the two cases produced a strange alignment on the 
Court. Only Justices Alito and Sotomayor agreed with Justice 
Kennedy that both were justiciable.227 Justices Roberts and Scalia 
thought neither was. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan thought 
Windsor justiciable, but not Hollingsworth. Justice Thomas reached 
the opposite conclusion—that Senator Hollingsworth had standing 
but BLAG did not.228 
Justice Alito wrote separately in Windsor to argue that 
Congress—by its designee BLAG—has standing as a matter of law 
“whenever federal legislation it had passed was struck down” (or the 
statute’s “validity” was challenged).229 Justice Alito’s view on 
legislative standing appeared to be subject to one or, possibly, two 
conditions. First, the injury must be to Congress as a whole, as 
opposed to individual members of Congress.230 Second, while Justice 
226. Id. at 2686–88. The Supreme Court’s reasoning included two conclusions: (i) failing to
decide DOMA’s constitutionality would result in litigation scattered in district courts “throughout 
the nation” involving “over 1,000 federal statutes [which DOMA affects] and a myriad of federal 
regulations” and (ii) with the attorney general refusing to defend DOMA and with BLAG willing 
to vigorously defend DOMA, it is prudent for the Supreme Court to grant standing to BLAG. 
227. Justice Alito disagreed with Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor on the merits in Windsor
and would presumably disagree on the merits in Hollingsworth, had Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
reached that far. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711. 
228. This unusual alignment may have been a product of compromise.
229. As for the United States as a distinct party, Justice Alito’s dissent said that because the
government was aligned with the plaintiff on the merits, who had prevailed below, it could not 
appeal merely to seek affirmance. For the Court to grant the United States status in such a case, 
“would be to render an advisory opinion.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2712. Although Justice Alito did 
not cite caselaw, his conclusion seems to be well-supported. See United States v. Johnson, 319 
U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (absent “a genuine adversary issue between . . . parties,” federal court “may 
not safely proceed to judgment.”); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 47, 47–48 (1971) (“We are thus confronted with the anomaly that both litigants desire 
precisely the same result. . . . There is, therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of 
Art. III of the Constitution.”) (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)). 
230. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2713 (Individual members who “have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action” lack standing.). 
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Alito was not explicit, Congress’s standing might depend on the 
Executive Branch’s refusal to defend the statute.231 
More recently, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission,232 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that state legislatures have standing to challenge actions 
that affect their power. There, an initiative divested the Legislature of 
its redistricting authority and reposed that power in an independent 
commission. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion held the 
Legislature to be a proper “institutional plaintiff asserting an 
institutional injury.”233  
While Arizona State Legislature and Windsor are the latest 
legislative standing cases, INS v. Chadha234 may be the best known. 
There, INS, as the relevant Executive Branch agency, agreed with an 
immigrant facing deportation that a “legislative veto” embodied in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act235 was unconstitutional. The 
House and Senate filed separate actions against INS, arguing that 
they had standing to defend the validity of the Act, which they had 
passed and which otherwise lacked a defense. The Supreme Court 
held that the House and Senate were “proper parties” to defend the 
Act. “We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend 
the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a 
defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs 
that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”236 
While the INS opinion affirms Congress’s standing to defend its 
statutes—at least in the absence of the Executive branch’s 
defense—legislative standing has limits. First, if Congress’s power is 
merely diluted rather than nullified, then Congress lacks standing. In 
Raines v. Byrd,237 Senator Harry Byrd sued to declare that the Line 
Item Veto Act violated separation-of-powers principles. The 
231. See id. at 2714 (“Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when the
Executive refuses to do so on constitutional grounds.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also id. at 2712 (“Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency 
of government . . . agrees . . . that the statute is . . . unconstitutional.”). 
232. No. 13-1314, slip op. (U.S. June 29, 2015).
233. Id. at 12.
234. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (2000) (repealed 1996).
236. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983). Professors Grove and Devins take issue with
the “history” recounted in Chadha, as well as the decision itself. Grove & Devins, supra note 
214, at 630. 
237. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
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Supreme Court held that Senator Byrd lacked standing, because, 
inter alia, a line item veto could be overridden according to 
procedures specified in the Act.238 Accordingly, Congress’s authority 
was merely “diluted,” not “nullified,” as it had been in Coleman v. 
Miller.239 Under Raines’ modified test for legislative standing, 
dilution of legislative power was too abstract an injury to satisfy 
Article III. 
A second possible limit on legislative standing stems from the 
distinction between legislatures and legislators as parties. The 
Supreme Court has been unclear as to whether individual legislators 
can sue in their own right or only as representatives of their body. 
Until recently, official capacity suits by individual legislators were 
relatively common.240 But recent cases have suggested that lawsuits 
by legislators acting without the body’s blessing raise questions.241 
For instance, in Goldwater v. Carter,242 Senator Barry Goldwater 
challenged President Carter’s abrogation of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and Taiwan, thereby recognizing 
the People’s Republic as the sole government of China.243 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the case without a majority opinion. 
Justice Powell concurred on ripeness grounds: 
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the 
President’s action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has 
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a 
238. Raines, 521 U.S. at 812. On the merits, Senator Byrd was clearly right, and the Supreme
Court so declared a few years later in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
239. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (“[P]laintiffs include twenty senators,
whose votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught . . . [w]e think 
[they] have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”); 
see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 822–23 (1997). 
240. There is an extensive discussion of congressional standing in Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1381–82 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where a special 3-judge district court (including then
Judge Scalia) invalidated the Balanced Budget Act in a suit brought by Rep. Synar on his own.
The court held that “specific injury to a legislator in his official capacity may constitute
cognizable harm sufficient to confer standing upon him.” Id. Also, “a Member of Congress may
have standing where he alleges a ‘specific and cognizable’ [injury] arising out of an interest
‘positively identified by the Constitution.’” Id. at 1382; see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual members of Congress have standing), rev’d on other grounds, Burke
v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
241. This is not the case when a legislator sues to vindicate a personal, rather than
institutional interest. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In contrast to Powell, most 
cases involving legislative standing are brought by individual legislators in their institutional 
capacities. The legislator claims injury to the office rather than to the person holding office. 
242. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
243. Id.
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change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has taken 
no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do 
not know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation 
between the Legislative and Executive Branches. . . . It 
cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has 
rejected the President’s claim. If the Congress chooses not 
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so.244 
The Court also questioned the propriety of individual legislator 
suits in Karcher and Raines. In Karcher, the Court dismissed an 
appeal by individual legislators after they lost their leadership 
positions. Since they had intervened “in their official capacities as 
presiding officers on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature,” once 
they lost those posts, “the authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of 
the legislature belong[ed] to those who succeeded [them] in 
office.”245 
Similarly in Raines, after holding that Senator Byrd’s injury was 
inadequate for standing (because his power was “diluted” rather than 
“nullified”), the Court added: “[w]e attach some importance to the 
fact that appellees have not been authorized to represent their 
respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses 
actively oppose their suit.”246 Thus, in a way, Byrd was challenging 
his fellow Senators and Representatives—an “intra-parliamentary 
controversy.”247 “Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies 
do not have standing to perfect an appeal the body itself has declined 
to take.”248 But even there, the Court was circumspect, noting that 
state law might entitle a lone legislator “to protect ‘the effectiveness 
of [his][vote].’”249 
Perhaps the most that can be said in this regard is that legislative 
standing will be more likely to be found where the legislative body 
244. Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring).
245. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987).
246. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). Justice Ginsburg stressed this point in Arizona
State Legislature, noting that unlike Raines, the Arizona Legislature had authorized the suit 
involved there. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip 
op. at 12 (U.S. June 29, 2015). 
247. See id. at 830 n.11 (“it is far from clear that this injury is “fairly traceable” to appellants,
as our precedents require, since the alleged cause of appellees's injury is not appellants’ exercise 
of legislative power but the actions of their own colleagues in Congress in passing the Act.”). 
248. Id. at 829 n.10 (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544
(1986)). 
249. Id. at 824 n.6.
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as a whole authorizes suit, typically through designated members. 
We see this more as a prudential separation-of-powers concern, as 
noted in Goldwater, than as a categorical Article III rule.250 When a 
federal court is asked to intervene in a “constitutional 
confrontation”251 between Congress and the Executive, there at least 
ought to be a “true impasse” between the two branches.252 
2. Applying Legislative Standing to
Initiative Proponents 
Does legislative standing provide a basis for initiative 
proponents to claim Article III standing to defend “their” initiatives? 
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, this question of 
proponents’ authority under state law was unasked and unanswered 
by the Supreme Court (although answered affirmatively by the Ninth 
Circuit). By contrast, the California Supreme Court in Perry III did 
rule on proponents’ authority to represent the state’s interest, holding 
that, under state law, the proponents had such authority. But the 
California court did not rule on whether proponents were analogous 
to the legislature.253 Perry III also did not expressly consider whether 
proponents were quasi-legislators for purposes of defending 
Proposition 8. Had the Ninth Circuit asked that precise question in 
Perry II and had the California Supreme court answered it 
250. See also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In congressional lawsuits
against the Executive Branch, a concern for the separation of powers has led this court 
consistently to dismiss actions by individual congressmen whose real grievance consists of their 
having failed to persuade their fellow legislators of their point of view, and who seek the court's 
aid in overturning the results of the legislative process.”); rev’d on other grounds, Burke v. 
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). 
251. See Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the
Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 
365 (1997). 
252. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
253. Not only was the posture of the litigation in Arizonans different than that in
Hollingsworth, so too was the effect of dismissal. Because even the district court lacked 
jurisdiction in Arizonans. 520 U.S. at 74. Its judgment invalidating the measure was vacated, 
leaving the constitutional provision intact. (It was ultimately invalidated by the state supreme 
court, Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998)). In contrast, Proposition 8 is now inoperative, 
under the district court’s judgment in Hollingsworth, a judgment that is unaffected by the 
subsequent withdrawal of parties defendant. That contrast must be seen in light of an admonition 
in the Court’s opinion in Arizonans: that “[r]espect for the place of the States in our federal 
system” requires a closer examination of the standing question. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 75. We 
have found one other case where initiative proponents’ lack of standing resulted in the lower 
court’s judgment of unconstitutionality becoming final. The Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. 
Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 460 U.S. 1077 (1983). That was a summary dismissal without 
opinion, so it provides little guidance here. 
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affirmatively, might this theory of standing have allowed the 
Supreme Court to reach the merits in Hollingsworth? 
An argument in favor of such standing would begin with the 
presumption that, had Proposition 8 been a statute enacted by the 
Legislature, the Legislature would have had standing to defend it in 
federal court once Attorney General Brown declined to do so. This 
presumption would seem to follow directly from Karcher and 
Chadha. However unlike those cases, the relevant law in 
Hollingsworth—Proposition 8—was not a statute enacted by the 
Legislature, but was an initiative proposed and passed by the voters. 
The California Supreme Court has described California’s 
initiative power as “essentially a legislative authority,” one 
manifesting the people’s ultimate sovereignty under the state 
constitution.254 It is the principal organ of direct democracy. Since 
through the initiative the people act as a super-legislature, their 
standing as legislators should be no less than that of elected 
legislators. True, as the chief justice wrote in Hollingsworth, the 
people are not “public officials” in the republican sense, but the very 
purpose of the institution of direct democracy is to bypass—or 
surpass—officialdom. By proposing and then approving Proposition 
8, the people withdrew the power previously delegated to such 
officials and reasserted the “inherent political power”255 that they 
have “reserved” to themselves.256 Direct democracy is not republican 
democracy.257 
254. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1027; see also Builders Ass’n of Santa Clara-Santa Cruz Cntys. v.
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1974) (The initiative “represents an exercise by the 
people of their reserved power to legislate.”). The Supreme Court has generally agreed with this 
characterization. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 567 (1916) (people may act 
as the legislature for purposes of Art. I, § 4; “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”); 
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (a municipal referendum “is 
the city itself legislating through its voters—an exercise by the voters of their traditional right 
through direct legislation”). 
255. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
256. Id. art. IV, § 1.
257. See Sherman J. Clark, Tales Of Popular Sovereignty: Direct Democracy In America, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1560, 1569 (1999) (direct democracy “always trumps republican democracy”). 
Chief Justice Roberts seemingly disagreed with this assessment, claiming that the Constitution 
recognizes only representative institutions as “legislatures.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. 
Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 29, 2015). His dissent in that case 
reinforced the preference for republicanism over direct democracy that he displayed in 
Hollingsworth. Id. 
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While the Supreme Court has not itself embraced the theory that 
initiative proponents are analogous to legislators, it recognized for 
some purposes the constitutionality of states’ authority to establish 
“‘the electorate . . . as a coordinate source of legislation’ on equal 
footing with the representative legislative body.”258 There is also 
state law and scholarly support for the notion that initiative voters are 
quasi-legislators. Some writers start from the premise that “initiative 
proponents are . . . unelected lawmakers” exercising delegated 
power.259 Others accept the formal analogy but note structural 
differences between “voter-legislators” and elected legislators, such 
as the lack of deliberation and party discipline.260 
There remains an important step in completing the analogy 
between the proponents of an initiative and a legislature defending its 
powers or enactments. As Karcher, Raines, and Goldwater intimate, 
individual legislators might lack standing on their own behalf, and 
may need authorization from their legislative body to bring or 
intervene in a case. Proponents do have an “official” status under 
California law, but they are akin to individual sponsors of legislation, 
rather than to the legislature as a whole.261 If it is the “people” 
collectively who are analogous to the legislature, must proponents 
obtain the “people’s” authorization before they can assert legislative 
standing? 
In answering these questions, we should keep in mind the 
reasons why the Supreme Court might require individual legislators 
to be authorized by their bodies. There are at least two prudential 
concerns: first, to avoid internecine warfare in the form of 
“intra-parliamentary disputes,” and second, to avoid embroiling the 
federal courts unnecessarily in inter-branch disputes, which often 
merely compounds the separation-of-powers problem the case was 
intended to redress.262 
258. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, slip op. at 5 (citations omitted) (demonstrating that
initiatives and referenda are part of the legislative power). 
259. Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (2003). 
260. Glenn C. Smith, More D (Deliberation) for California’s DD (Direct Democracy), 48
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011). 
261. Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris, 755 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir.
2014). 
262. See supra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
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These problems do not generally arise with initiatives. 
Presumably, proponents, the petition signers who qualify a measure 
for the ballot, and the electorate are not acting at cross-purposes. But 
if formalism is the key, as it often is in standing, then we should 
more carefully consider the analogy between proponents and 
legislatures as made by the lower courts in Arizonans and Perry III. 
California has two forms of initiatives: statutory and 
constitutional. With statutory initiatives, the electorate is analogous 
to the legislature, since the ballot measure does not become law until 
approved by the voters. Thus, if one formally analogizes initiative 
proponents to legislators, legislative standing might not be a viable 
theory for proponents of an initiative statute, at least without some 
expression of voter authorization for the proponents to defend the 
measure. 
When it comes to constitutional initiatives, such as Proposition 
8, the analogy is more complex. Under California’s constitution, 
constitutional amendments may be proposed in either of two ways. 
First, the legislature, upon a two-thirds vote of both houses, may 
propose a constitutional amendment for the ballot; the amendment is 
then put to the voters for approval.263 Second, a constitutional 
amendment may be proposed by the people: proponents draft the 
proposed amendment and then gather the required signatures 
(currently, approximately 800,000) to have the proposed amendment 
put on the ballot for voter approval.264 
For constitutional initiatives, then, it is not the voters who are 
analogous to the legislature, but the electors who sign the qualifying 
petitions. Once the constitutional initiative qualifies for the ballot, 
the legislative role is complete. The voters are no longer mere 
legislators; they are the ultimate sovereign in reforming their state’s 
constitution. The process of qualifying an initiative for the ballot is 
the functional equivalent of a proposed amendment being voted out 
of both houses of the legislature. Then the question arises whether 
the signers of the qualifying petitions have authorized proponents to 
defend the initiative should it pass, and should state officials decline 
to defend it. We think that constructive authorization might be 
263. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
264. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9000–18 (West 2015); CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10; id. art. XVIII,
§ 3.
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implied in the act of signing the initiative petition.265 More 
particularly, the proponents’ obligations under the Elections Code to 
submit the proposed initiative to the attorney general for captioning, 
to gather signatures, to submit signed petitions for verification, and 
to sign ballot arguments266 all may suggest signers’—and even 
voters’—understanding of proponents’ authority vis-à-vis the 
initiative. It seems a small leap to extend this authority to defending 
the initiative. 
Does the proponent qua legislator analogy hold for standing 
purposes? Perhaps not, if “republican” government is the only 
possible context for Article III standing. A court could require that 
the case or controversy requirement be read in pari passu with the 
Guaranty Clause.267 But that would lead to an anomalous result, 
because the Guaranty Clause is itself non-justiciable.268 Also, this 
connection was not made in Hollingsworth. 
In Perry II, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme 
Court whether “proponents of an initiative may possess a 
particularized interest in defending the constitutionality of their 
initiative upon its enactment” or “were authorized to defend that 
initiative, as agents of the People.”269 Perhaps, a third question 
should have been asked: do the proponents have particularized 
legislative or other institutional interests at stake that is separate from 
the state’s interests? This third question might have been implicit in 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for certifying the question. The court 
stated: 
Rather than rely on our own understanding of this balance 
of power under the California Constitution, however, we 
certify the question so that the [California Supreme] Court 
may provide an authoritative answer as to the rights, 
interests, and authority under California law of the official 
proponents of an initiative measure to defend its validity 
265. If the signatories/proponents-as-legislature analogy were strictly applied, proponents
might be able to defend a constitutional initiative, but not a statutory one. This result would seem 
to lack any basis in policy. 
266. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9001, 9004(b), 9032, and 9067(b).
267. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a republican form of government . . . .”). 
268. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 26 (1849); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118, 149–51 (1912). 
269. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011).
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upon its enactment in the case of a challenge to its 
constitutionality, where the state officials charged with that 
duty refuse to execute it.270 
The context of the question, the “balance of power” 
terminology, together with the notion of an executive veto of an 
initiative, raises the possibility that the court was asking about 
proponents’ legislative authority. And while the California Supreme 
Court unanimously believed it was confirming proponents’ authority 
to defend their initiative, it did so in a way that sidestepped what, in 
retrospect, may have been a superior theory, namely legislative 
standing.271 
V. WHAT HOLLINGSWORTH MEANS FOR CALIFORNIA
AND OTHER INITIATIVE STATES. 
A. Hollingsworth Creates an Executive Veto over Initiatives
From a practical perspective, state officials’ failure to defend an
initiative challenged in federal court could make a judgment of 
invalidity more likely, either because the officials admit the 
invalidity in their answer (as they did in Perry I), stipulate to a 
judgment of invalidity, or fail to answer and thereby default.272 Such 
a judgment by the trial court would be conclusive since, under 
Hollingsworth, initiative proponents lack standing to appeal. 
The executive veto created by Hollingsworth undermines both 
state sovereignty and core principles of democracy. As Justice 
Kennedy noted in his dissent in Hollingsworth, 
The essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests 
in the people and flows to the government, not the other 
way around. Freedom resides first in the people without 
need of a grant from government. The California initiative 
process embodies these principles and has done so for over 
a century. “Through the structure of its government, and the 
270. Id.
271. Notwithstanding this theoretical possibility, the Hollingsworth majority’s language
might be inhospitable to using the proponents-are-legislators analogy as a basis for standing. The 
majority, in discussing Karcher, states that proponents “hold no office and have always 
participated in this litigation solely as private parties.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 
2665 (2013). The majority then concludes, “We have never before upheld the standing of a 
private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not 
to. We decline to do so for the first time here.” Id. at 2668. 
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B), 55(a), 55(b)(2).
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character of those who exercise government authority, a 
State defines itself as sovereign.”273 
The Hollingsworth majority also ignores the foundational 
principle of direct democracy. Rather than “reserving to the people” 
the powers of initiative and referendum,274 Hollingsworth allows 
executive officials to veto that power, perhaps in a way that escapes 
judicial review. A state official’s actions may have political 
consequences, but, in the meantime, the purpose of the initiative 
process has been compromised. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that at least two, or possibly 
three, types of private parties’ standing remain viable: 
(1) The majority’s decision would be inapplicable in state court
proceedings.275 For example, after Proposition 8 was approved by the 
voters, it was challenged in state court as being an impermissible 
constitutional revision rather than a permissible constitutional 
amendment. There, Proposition 8’s proponents had standing to assert 
the state’s interest in upholding the initiative.276 
(2) Even in federal court, private parties could defend an
initiative if they could show that invalidating it would affect them in 
a “personal and individual way.” In such cases, private parties could 
assert their own standing (under the first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Perry II inquiry), even absent the private parties’ ability to assert the 
state’s interest or legislative standing. For example, if a federal 
constitutional challenge were made to California’s tax-limiting 
Proposition 13, any real property owner whose own taxes would be 
affected by a finding of unconstitutionality would have standing to 
defend it, even without an official defense of the law. This individual 
standing possibility may lead to unfortunate policy implications. Any 
pro-business initiative could be defended by a business that would 
stand to benefit from the initiative. By contrast, some initiatives 
supported for social reasons—such as Proposition 8—would lack 
273. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). 
274. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. (Hollingsworth does not expressly apply to referenda—where
the people have the power to approve or reject legislation—but the standing principles announced 
there would seem to apply equally to that form of direct democracy as well.). 
275. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do we question . . . the right of initiative
proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III does not apply.”). 
276. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 63–64, 69 (Cal. 2009). More generally, the
California Supreme Court’s Perry III decision that proponents have standing to represent the state 
would be binding on California state courts. 
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defenders with standing. The ironic result is that, while California’s 
initiative process was adopted to reduce the power of Southern 
Pacific Railroad and other big businesses, Hollingsworth has 
reversed this policy. After Hollingsworth, pro-business initiatives 
will always have defenders with standing, but some social initiatives 
may lack such defenders. 
(3) While the Hollingsworth majority did not expressly so hold,
it may be that, before the election, proponents would have standing 
to defend their initiatives in federal court.277 It is theoretically 
possible that signature gathering, signature verification, the election 
itself, or some other pre-enactment activity could be challenged 
under federal law. Under such a scenario, the various California 
Elections Code sections that the majority held inapposite to a 
challenge after the election, might confer standing on the proponents 
prior to the election. 
Apart from these scenarios, we conclude that Hollingsworth has 
created the power of executive veto over those initiatives challenged 
in federal courts.278 
Finally it is important to note that the effect of the holding in 
Hollingsworth does not appear to be limited to California. While 
Hollingsworth dealt with California law, the principles set forth by 
the majority would appear to be generally applicable, especially 
because the majority disregarded state law on the question of agency. 
In sum, all states that provide for initiative laws face the likely 
prospect that proponents would lack standing to defend passed 
initiatives in federal court. 
277. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (“[Proponents] argue that the California
Constitution and its election laws give them a ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’ role in the 
initiative process—one ‘involving both authority and responsibilities that differ from other 
supporters of the measure.’ True enough—but only when it comes to the process of enacting the 
law. . . . [O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by the voters, the measure became ‘a duly enacted 
constitutional amendment or statute.’ [Proponents] have no role—special or otherwise—in the 
enforcement of Proposition 8. They therefore have no ‘personal stake’ in defending its 
enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California.” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
278. While Proposition 8 was a statewide initiative, the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the
above analysis would appear to apply in the same way to local initiatives in California. Cf. City of 
Santa Monica v. Stewart, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 93–94 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing to statewide initiative 
case law as precedent for local initiatives), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 28, 2005). 
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B. Unanswered Questions in Hollingsworth
1. What is the Effect of Hollingsworth in Trial Courts?
The Supreme Court expressly held that Proposition 8’s 
proponents could not appeal from the district court’s decision in 
Perry I, and accordingly vacated the Court of Appeals judgment. 
However, Perry I—in which the proponents had successfully 
intervened—was left intact, thereby possibly leaving open the 
question of whether initiatives’ proponents may intervene as 
defendants at trial. 
A recent district court decision dealt with this question by 
narrowly reading Hollingsworth’s applicability at trial. Vivid 
Entertainment v. Fielding279 involved a challenge to a 
voter-approved Los Angeles County initiative—Measure B—that, 
inter alia, required the use of condoms in adult films made in the 
county.280 Plaintiffs were producers and actors who challenged 
Measure B on First Amendment grounds. The named defendants—
the county and certain officials—appeared by outside counsel who 
filed an answer that lacked “vigor” (using Perry III terminology). 
The answer stated that the complaint “presents important 
constitutional questions that require and warrant judicial 
determination” and was otherwise noncommittal about Measure B’s 
validity.281 
Early in the case—before Hollingsworth—Measure B’s 
proponents successfully moved to intervene as defendants. After 
Hollingsworth, plaintiffs asked the district court to reconsider its 
grant of intervention.282 The district court denied reconsideration, 
holding that Hollingsworth, by leaving Perry I intact, “implicitly 
approved of the framework currently at issue: at the district court 
level, intervention by initiative proponents is proper when the 
government is enforcing the initiative but refuses to defend it, 
regardless of whether the interveners have standing independent of 
the government defendants.”283 Vivid also held that, while plaintiffs 
279. 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014).
280. Id. at 571.
281. See Defendants’ Answer To Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 1, Vivid Entm’t LLC v. Fielding,
No. CV 13-00190 DDP (AGI) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF No. 21. 
282. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, No. CV 13-00190 DDP AGRX, 2013 WL 3989558, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2013).
283. Id.
1124 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1069 
must have standing, Ninth Circuit precedent, “though somewhat 
ambiguous, generally indicates that interveners are not required to 
demonstrate Article III standing independent of the defendants.”284 
Vivid distinguished away the Hollingsworth holding in two ways: (i) 
Hollingsworth does not apply at trial, and (ii) even if Hollingsworth 
generally applies at trial, it does not apply to intervening defendants, 
provided that the intervenors are allied with parties having standing 
to defend the initiative. 
With regard to point (i), however, Hollingsworth’s language 
appears broad enough to apply at trial: “Article III demands that an 
‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation. That 
means that standing must be met by persons seeking appellate 
review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first 
instance.”285 
With regard to point (ii), the question seems more complex, 
because, as often occurs with initiatives, putative intervening 
proponents may not be allied with the governmental defendants or 
other parties with standing. Perhaps an intervenor need only satisfy 
Rule 24(a) if she enters a case on the side of a party with standing,286 
but if there is no such party, then the intervenor would need to show 
standing in her own right.287 Thus, in a case such as Arizonans, 
where state defendants are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds, initiative proponents may not be able to intervene, even at 
trial. 
For example, could proponents intervene as defendants at trial 
when: 
• state defendants defend without vigor? (This question was
specifically raised in Vivid.)
284. Id. at *2.
285. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
286. Ninth Circuit precedent, unless overruled by Hollingsworth, permits so-called
“piggyback” standing, allowing an intervenor to use the standing of a party from the same side 
already in the action. State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 846 n.9 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (a plaintiff-intervenor “did not need to meet Article III standing requirements to 
intervene”). However, other circuits do require intervenors to demonstrate Article III standing. 
E.g., Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U.L.Q. 215, 270 (2000) (“Three courts of appeals have held that a proposed intervenor
must demonstrate interests sufficient to satisfy the standing inquiry in order to intervene.”). These
courts are the D.C. Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit.
287. That is essentially what Judge Walker ruled in Perry I.
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• state defendants default so that a judgment—invalidating the
initiative—could be entered?288
• state defendants stipulate to entry of judgment of the
initiative’s invalidity?
All of these scenarios could result in an “executive veto” of an 
initiative. 
The last scenario listed above, that of a stipulated judgment, is 
perhaps especially problematic. If an initiative’s proponents lack 
party status prior to judgment, they may object to a stipulated 
judgment of invalidity but may not by right, derail it. While the 
district judge must consider the public interest in entering a 
stipulated judgment,289 proponents would be relegated to the position 
of “bystanders.”290 
2. Under Hollingsworth, Must Appellees Have Standing?
Apart from these trial court issues, a further question remains 
when a Hollingsworth-type case is on appeal: must proponents have 
standing as appellees? If a district court has ruled an initiative 
constitutional, the plaintiffs—who had alleged the initiative’s 
unconstitutionality—may appeal. Would the proponents be allowed 
to defend the initiative as appellees, even if the elected officials are 
inactive (or affirmatively agree with appellants) in the appeal? 
The Ninth Circuit may have partially answered the question in 
two 2014 opinions. In the first case, Latta v. Otter,291 plaintiff 
same-sex couples sued Nevada’s governor and three county officials, 
seeking to overturn Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban.292 The ban had 
been enacted as a constitutional initiative proposed by the Coalition 
for the Protection of Marriage (“Coalition”).293 At trial, the Coalition, 
with the plaintiffs’ consent, was permitted to intervene as a 
288. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B).
289. Consumer Advocacy Grp., Inc. v. Kintetsu Enters. of Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647, 659–60
(Ct. App. 2006). 
290. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663 (“[O]nce Proposition 8 was approved by the
voters, [the Official Proponents] have no role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement of 
Proposition 8. . . . They therefore have no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is 
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of California.”). 
291. 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
292. Id. at 464.
293. Coalition’s Motion To Intervene, at 6, 13 & App.1, at 2, 28–29.
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defendant.294 The district court upheld the constitutionality of 
Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban, and plaintiffs appealed.295 In the 
Ninth Circuit, Nevada’s governor and county officials filed 
answering briefs, but then—after Windsor and SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. Abbott Labs296 were decided—withdrew the briefs. Nevada, 
however, continued to enforce the initiative. The Coalition then 
appeared via briefs and oral argument without objection by 
plaintiffs-appellants.297 The Ninth Circuit accepted the Coalition’s 
appearance: “[h]earing from the Coalition helps us to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions.”298 
The second case, Vivid, extended Latta, holding that initiative 
proponents would be allowed to appear as appellees even without the 
plaintiff-appellants’ consent and without an indication that the 
challenged law was being enforced. In Vivid, the district court largely 
upheld Measure B, and plaintiffs appealed. The county defendants 
“elect[ed] not to file an answering brief” in the Ninth Circuit.299 
Measure B’s proponents, who had intervened as defendants at trial, 
asserted their own right to appear as appellees. Plaintiffs opposed 
this assertion, citing Hollingsworth.300 The Ninth Circuit sided with 
Measure B’s proponents, holding that an intervenor-appellee who 
does not “initiate an action” or “seek review on appeal” and who 
“performs . . . no other function that invokes the power of the federal 
courts need not meet Article III standing requirements.”301 The court 
added that it was not deciding whether the proponents satisfied the 
294. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th
Cir. 2014). 
295. Id. at 1021.
296. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation), reh’g en banc denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014). 
297. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 465–66 (9th Cir. 2014).
298. Id. at 466.
299. Letter from Joel N. Klevens, Attorney for Defendant-Appellees Jonathan Fielding,
Jackie Lacey & Cnty. of Los Angeles, to Molly C. Dwyer, Clerk of Court, U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 9th Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.aidshealth.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2013/06/Vivid-Entertainment-LLC-Letter-to-Ms.-Molly-C.-Dwyer.pdf. 
300. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Vivid Entertainment, LLC; Califa Productions, Inc.; Jane
Doe a/k/a Kayden Kross & John Doe a/k/a Logan Pierce passim, Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 
774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13–56445), 2013 WL 5314681 passim (citing Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)). 
301. Vivid, 774 F.3d at 573.
2015] STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES 1127 
standing requirements, but that standing was simply not required of 
appellees.302 
In sum, Latta and Vivid hold that, even when government 
appellees do not actively participate on appeal, initiative proponents 
may do so without independently meeting standing requirements.303 
But the opinions leave unresolved the question of whether such a 
case is otherwise justiciable if government appellees are not merely 
passive, but affirmatively agree with appellants that the challenged 
law is unconstitutional. In that event, the federal case might be 
non-justiciable for lack of a threshold “case or controversy.”304 
Perhaps such a case could not proceed unless the court found that 
other appellees, such as proponents who would provide the necessary 
“genuine controversy” on appeal, independently had standing as 
appellees, an issue that every court has sidestepped thus far. 
VI. FIXING HOLLINGSWORTH
Hollingsworth has created both practical and theoretical 
obstacles to the exercise of direct democracy. Some remedy would 
seem necessary going forward if “that safeguard which the people 
should retain for themselves” is to have meaning.305 Some have 
called for structural reform. For instance, in 
302. Id.
303. As a matter of general appellate procedure, even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to
reverse Latta or Vivid on appellees’ standing, such a decision might not dispose of a Latta- or 
Vivid-type appeal. First, the official defendants could remain as appellees, albeit as passive ones. 
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(c), a failure to file an appellee’s brief means only 
that the party “will not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants permission.” FED. R. 
APP. P. 31(c). Accordingly, the circuit court will still decide the appeal on the merits, and need 
not automatically decide against a party failing to file a brief. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 
465 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 887 n.7 (9th Cir. 
2010)) (“Although the state defendants withdrew their briefs, we are required to ascertain and rule 
on the merits arguments in the case, rather than ruling automatically in favor of 
plaintiffs-appellants.”). Second, proponents, even if not appellees, can still have their arguments 
considered by the court as amici. See FED. R. APP. P. 29. Thus, official state defendants may have 
less ability to “veto” an initiative once the district court has upheld it. In sum, proponents’ lack of 
standing on appeal is probably less of a threat to their initiative than is their lack of standing at 
trial. 
304. In Windsor, Justice Kennedy stated that Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement
was satisfied so long as the government continued to enforce the challenged law, even if it agreed 
with petitioners on the merits. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013). But see 
supra note 214. With such continued enforcement, Kennedy felt that the government’s lack of 
defense raised only a prudential concern. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. However, as noted above, 
the enforcement element did not appear in Vivid, yet the Ninth Circuit still decided the appeal on 
the merits, never addressing the issue of whether a case or controversy existed. 
305. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1016 (Cal. 2011).
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ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen,306 Judge Clifford Wallace 
suggested that: 
[T]he State of California would do well to consider
legislating a process whereby the State’s elected officials
would be obliged to defend the State’s duly enacted laws in
court, rather than leaving it to the unfettered discretion of
the Attorney General to pick and choose which of the
State’s laws he or she elects to defend.307
We agree with this general sentiment. But, as a threshold matter,
any reform must reckon with three general criteria set forth by the 
Court in Hollingsworth: (1) the state’s representatives must be 
“public officials;” (2) the state must be able to exercise some control 
over its representatives, perhaps including the right to terminate the 
representation; and (3) the representatives must owe fiduciary 
obligations to the state.308 
We examine four potential solutions: (1) the possibility that 
California’s existing constitution or statutes may already provide a 
mechanism for forcing state officials to defend passed initiatives; (2) 
a new independent state agency charged with defending state 
initiatives; (3) the appointment of an ad hoc special counsel with the 
same responsibilities; and (4) language within an initiative itself that 
would allow proponents to seek the appointment of a special counsel. 
A. Existing California Law
Several California state constitutional provisions and statutes 
suggest that the attorney general and other executive officers have 
affirmative duties in connection with state laws. In this Section we 
discuss whether those laws may be used to force the attorney general 
(or equivalent officer of a local agency) to defend an initiative.309 
306. 752 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2014).
307. Id. at 852 n.2 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
308. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665–67 (2013).
309. Similar obligations and remedies may lie in states beyond California, but we express no
opinion on them. 
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1. State Executive Officials’ Duty to Defend State Law
(a).  California Constitution, Article III, Section 3.5
and the Associated Rule 
Article III, Section 3.5 of the California Constitution states, inter 
alia: 
An administrative agency, including an administrative 
agency created by the Constitution or an initiative statute, 
has no power: (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or 
refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being 
unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a 
determination that such statute is unconstitutional; (b) To 
declare a statute unconstitutional.310 
This constitutional amendment was proposed by the Legislature 
and adopted by voters in 1978 in response to a California Supreme 
Court holding that the state Public Utilities Commission’s 
quasi-judicial powers included the power to declare a state statute 
unconstitutional.311 That holding was overruled by section 3.5, the 
voters agreeing with the Legislature that only the courts should rule 
on constitutional matters. 
In Lockyer,312 the California Supreme Court found it 
unnecessary to decide whether section 3.5 applied to local executive 
officials. There, a city clerk had decided that state law313 prohibiting 
same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, and began issuing marriage 
licenses. The attorney general filed an original action in the 
California Supreme Court to enjoin the clerk’s actions as violating 
section 3.5. The court held that, quite apart from section 3.5, 
background principles prohibited the city clerk from ignoring state 
law, even law she believed was unconstitutional.314 
The Lockyer court noted that section 3.5 left undisturbed the 
prior case law that executive officials, not just agencies with 
310. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
311. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 556 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1976), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5; see also Walker v. Munro, 2 Cal. Rptr. 737 
(Ct. App. 1960) (holding, similarly to the Southern Pacific court, that an administrative agency 
vested with quasi-judicial powers could rule on the constitutionality of a statute it was charged 
with enforcing), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5, as 
recognized in Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004). 
312. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
313. See supra Part III.A (discussing Proposition 22).
314. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 476.
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quasi-judicial powers, lacked the authority to declare state law 
unconstitutional.315 Thus, drawing on core principles of divided 
government, Lockyer held that local officials had no power to 
determine the constitutionality of statutes they are charged with 
enforcing.316 For purposes of simplicity, we call this the “Section 3.5 
Rule,” even though it includes background case law and goes beyond 
the text of section 3.5. 
Does the Section 3.5 Rule apply to the state’s elected attorney 
general and governor, the officials who are typically named in 
constitutional challenges to state law? They are not “administrative 
agencies” under a literal interpretation of section 3.5. But, as noted 
above, the Section 3.5 Rule goes further and could possibly be 
extended to state constitutional officers. However, in the Proposition 
8 litigation, neither the governor nor attorney general “declared” 
Proposition 8 unenforceable or unconstitutional; rather, a federal 
court in Perry I did so.317 Indeed, until Perry I’s injunction became 
final, the governor and attorney general continued to enforce, 
although not to defend, Proposition 8. Does the Section 3.5 Rule 
include such a duty to defend? 
Some scholars have argued that the president’s Article II 
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”318 
creates an affirmative duty, not only to enforce, but also to defend 
federal law, even law he feels is unconstitutional.319 Is a similar 
argument viable under the California Constitution where “[t]he 
Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed”?320 Similarly, 
“[i]t shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of 
315. Id. at 478–79.
316. See id. at 482 (“[I]t is abundantly clear that this constitutional amendment did not expand
the authority of such officials so as to permit them to refuse to enforce a statute solely on the basis 
of their view that the statute is unconstitutional. Accordingly, we conclude that under California 
law a local executive official generally lacks such authority.”). 
317. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Of course, as
noted above, supra Part III.E, the Ninth Circuit also decided that Proposition 8 was 
unconstitutional, Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), but Hollingsworth 
vacated this decision. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
318. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
319. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311,
1336 n.105 (2014) (arguing in favor of a duty to defend). But cf. Katherine Shaw, Constitutional 
Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 221–29 (2014) (arguing that the duty is more 
nuanced and limited). 
320. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”321 In addition to 
these express obligations, separation-of-powers principles may also 
impose an affirmative duty on executive officials to defend federal or 
state law, so as not to usurp the judicial power.322 Indeed, unlike the 
federal Constitution, where separation-of-powers is merely implied, 
the California Constitution makes it explicit.323 The Section 3.5 Rule 
reinforces that principle.324 
Perhaps an initiative’s proponents could argue that (i) 
California’s governor and attorney general are subject to the Section 
3.5 Rule and (ii) their failure to defend an initiative (or their express 
concession that an initiative is unconstitutional) has the same effect 
as declaring the initiative unconstitutional. Thus the Section 3.5 Rule 
might require state executive officials not merely to enforce state 
law, but to provide for a defense as well.325 This would require 
extending Lockyer and reconsidering case law that gives the attorney 
general discretion not to defend, at least where doing so deprives a 
court of jurisdiction.326 But given the “executive veto” such officials 
now have under Hollingsworth, a state court’s expansion of the 
Section 3.5 Rule might not be out of the question. 
321. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
322. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (“[I]f the Executive’s
agreement with a plaintiff that a law is unconstitutional is enough to preclude judicial review . . . . 
[I]t poses grave challenges to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment to
be able to nullify Congress’ enactment solely on its own initiative and without any determination
from the Court.”).
323. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The powers of state government are legislative, executive,
and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others 
except as permitted by this Constitution.”); see generally Shaw, supra note 319 (discussing state 
officials’ “duty to defend” in greater depth). 
324. We discuss possible exceptions to this principle below. See infra Part VI.A.1.(b).
325. We note that the attorney general has the ethical and professional obligation not to
present frivolous or legally erroneous arguments to a court. If, in her judgment, a state law is not 
defensible, her sole obligation under an expanded Section 3.5 Rule might be to preserve a court’s 
jurisdiction while others provide a defense. That was the course taken by U.S. Attorney General 
Holder in Windsor. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. Also, under existing California law, if a conflict 
arises “in any case” between, on the one hand, a county assessor or county sheriff and, on the 
other hand the county district attorney or county counsel, then the county “shall contract with and 
employ legal counsel to assist the assessor or the sheriff . . . .” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 31000.6 
(West 2014). 
326. See infra text accompanying notes 307–08 (discussing People ex rel. Deukmejian v.
Brown, 624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981)). Moreover, such a requirement might conflict with 
separation-of-powers principles. 
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(b).  Government Code Sections 12511 and 12512 
The attorney general’s constitutional “duty . . . to see that the 
laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced,”327 is made 
more specific by California Government Code sections 12511, which 
provides that the “Attorney General has charge, as attorney, of all 
legal matters in which the State is interested” and 12512, which 
provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall attend the Supreme Court 
and prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State 
officer is a party in his or her official capacity.”328 Later decisions 
have extended the attorney general’s authority to defend the state at 
all judicial proceedings, not just those in the supreme court.329 
While the attorney general has the ethical obligation not to 
advance arguments lacking merit, it is problematic if she takes a 
position antagonistic to state law. In Deukmejian, California’s 
attorney general filed an independent action to invalidate a statute 
that a state agency believed was valid. The agency sought to enjoin 
the attorney general from proceeding with his action on the ground 
that he could not take a position adverse to that of the agency. The 
California Supreme Court agreed, holding that the California State 
Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct—which applied to the attorney 
general, notwithstanding his status as an elected constitutional 
officer—barred him from taking a position adverse to his “client” 
(namely, the agency), especially after earlier advising the agency 
regarding the statute. If the attorney general believes a state law, 
presumably even an initiative constitutional amendment, to be 
unconstitutional, “the Attorney General could . . . properly withdraw 
as counsel for his state clients and authorize them to employ special 
counsel.”330 
327. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
328. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12511, 12512. Section 12512 is entitled “Attendance at Supreme
Court; prosecution and defense of causes.” Id. § 12512. 
329. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. C 04-02588 CRB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14357, at *17–18 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2005) (“In addition to his common-law 
powers, the Attorney General also has statutory authority [under sections 12511 and 12512 of the 
California Government Code] over ‘all legal matters in which the State is interested’ and the duty 
to ‘prosecute or defend all causes to which the State . . . is a party . . . .’”); Deukmejian, 624 P.2d 
1206. 
330. Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1207 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11040). This route—i.e.,
filing a notice of appeal and appointing special counsel—is the one taken by U.S. Attorney 
General Holder in Windsor. 
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May Deukmejian be extended to hold that, when a state law is 
challenged as unconstitutional, the attorney general has a mandatory 
duty (not just a right) to defend, or at least to arrange for independent 
counsel? We are uncertain here for two reasons. First, Deukmejian’s 
plain language stated that the attorney general has the choice not to 
represent “his state clients.” Second, the Deukmejian opinion’s actual 
text stated that the attorney general’s option to employ independent 
counsel was permissive, not mandatory. 
However, in Hollingsworth, the real party in interest arguably 
was the state. Named state officials were mere nominal parties.331 
The attorney general’s client in such case is not herself or the 
governor, and she does not represent their particular interests. 
Accordingly, section 12511 may arguably require the attorney 
general to provide, or provide for, defense of state law, at least where 
no one else has standing to do so. This would especially be 
appropriate in the case of initiatives where the client is not the state 
in its institutional sense, but rather the People of California.332 
Perhaps this problem could be vitiated by adding a section to the 
Government Code, say, section 12512.5: “If, notwithstanding 
Section 12512 above, the Attorney General decides not to defend an 
initiative passed by voters, then the Attorney General shall employ 
special counsel to represent the state.”333 
2. Mandamus to Enforce State Officials’ Duty
If initiative proponents have a right to force the attorney 
general to defend their initiative—whether directly or by special 
counsel—presumably the proponents would file a petition under 
section 1085(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure: “A writ of 
mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, 
corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of . . . a 
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.”334 
331. See supra text accompanying note 48.
332. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 566 n.3 (Cal. 1980) (suggesting
disapproval of city attorney’s refusal to defend a local initiative—“Apparently believing that his 
duty is to represent the city council instead of the voters of Costa Mesa, the city attorney did not 
defend the initiative.”). 
333. We note that even if a duty to defend were to be found under California law, a different
result might obtain with respect to the president. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The 
Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012). 
334. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085(a) (West 2014).
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Deukmejian expressly held that the attorney general may choose 
not to defend a statute; thus we doubt that a writ of mandate would 
lie to require the attorney general herself to undertake the defense of 
an initiative. Perhaps, depending on whether the Section 3.5 Rule or 
section 12512 of the California Government Code could be extended, 
a writ might lie that is limited to a mandate that: (1) the attorney 
general file a bare bones answer (in a trial court) or a notice of appeal 
(in an appellate court) so as to allow others—perhaps intervenors or 
amici—to defend, and (2) the attorney general employ special 
counsel for such officials and agencies that desire to have special 
counsel.335 
The attorney general might respond to such a writ petition by 
arguing that filing an answer or notice of appeal and employing 
special counsel are discretionary acts. However, even if a duty is 
discretionary, an attorney general’s refusal to answer, appeal, or 
employ special counsel might be considered an “abuse of discretion.” 
A writ of mandate may “be employed to prevent an abuse of 
discretion, or to correct an arbitrary action which does not amount to 
the exercise of discretion.”336 “The fact that the legal duty imposed 
upon the Attorney General . . . is one which calls for an exercise of 
discretion does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle under all 
situations.”337 Mandamus does lie to examine the exercise of 
discretion.338 
In addition, given the California Supreme Court’s strong defense 
of the initiative process in Perry III, state courts potentially could 
find that the attorney general has a constitutional obligation to 
protect initiatives challenged in federal court, at least to the extent of 
answering, appealing, and employing special counsel. This would 
include preserving the jurisdiction of federal trial and appellate 
courts by appearing in those courts, even where the attorney general 
does not defend on the merits. Whether initiative proponents are 
permitted to intervene in the law’s defense, or simply participate as 
335. As noted in footnote 325 supra, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 31000.6 already obligates a county
to engage counsel in the event of a conflict between the county assessor or sheriff and the 
county’s existing lawyers. If the county refuses to comply with § 31000.6, then a writ of mandate 
is the appropriate remedy. See Rivero v. Lake Cnty Bd. of Supervisors, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 769, 
775–76 (Ct. App. 2014). 
336. Bales v. Superior Court, 129 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1942).
337. In re Veterans’ Indus., Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 303, 317 (Ct. App. 1970).
338. Hollman v. Warren, 196 P.2d 562, 565 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
2015] STANDING IN INITIATIVE CASES 1135 
amici curiae, at least federal jurisdiction is preserved and the 
initiative gets due judicial consideration. 
Accordingly, in situations like Hollingsworth where it appears 
state defendants will fail to defend a validly-enacted initiative, a 
mandamus action in state court may lie forcing them to do so. It 
would be improper for the mandate to direct the state’s litigation 
strategy or superintend the defense. But, the procedural formalism of 
a defense—namely, the bare-bones answer or notice of appeal—is 
important to avoid the executive veto created in Hollingsworth. 
B. Structural Reforms
If existing law does not afford a remedy for proponents seeking 
to have their initiatives defended, what new laws might be enacted? 
We propose structural reforms that could work on either a permanent 
or a temporary basis. First, California could establish a standing 
Office of Initiative Support (OIS) that would have authority to 
defend initiatives that are challenged. Second, California could 
provide for appointment of a special counsel who could represent the 
state’s interest. We discuss each of these fixes in turn and then 
discuss how they could be implemented. Either of these fixes would 
be particularly useful when the state or local officials either fail to 
defend a passed initiative or defend without vigor. 
1. Permanent OIS
One fix might be for California to establish an OIS. A statute 
might be enacted along the following lines: 
(1) The OIS shall be an independent agency of the state of
California, governed by five board members selected in the same 
manner, with the same terms, qualifications and compensation as 
members of the Fair Political Practices Commission.339 
(2) The Legislature shall provide funding for the OIS sufficient
to hire lawyers and other staff and incur such expenses as may be 
necessary to carry out its duties. 
(3) Upon a statewide or local initiative being passed by voters
and challenged in court, the OIS shall be entitled to represent the 
339. Members of the Fair Political Practices Commission are appointed by the governor (two
members), the attorney general, secretary of state, and the controller (one each). They serve 
four-year non-renewable terms, and may be removed by the governor with concurrence of the 
Senate for misconduct and similar defalcations. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100–83105. 
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state or locality in that litigation.340 In connection with this 
representation, the OIS shall be authorized to take all reasonable 
steps to defend the initiative, giving due consideration to the views of 
the proponents as defined in section 9001(a) of the California 
Elections Code or in equivalent local laws. 
(4) The OIS’s lawyers and staff shall take the oath required of
all California public officers and employees.341 
(5) The OIS’s authority shall not preclude participation in court
by (a) other authorized state or local officials who have 
responsibilities under the law or (b) the initiative’s proponents, 
whether their positions are complimentary or opposing 
(6) The attorney general or the Sacramento County Superior
Court342 on its own motion shall have the right to seek to terminate 
the OIS’s representation in a particular proceeding upon a showing in 
the court that the OIS has abused or exceeded its authority. 
The OIS could have additional powers and responsibilities. For 
example, critics of California’s initiative process have suggested that 
an initiative’s proponents should first consult with governmental 
staff in drafting the initiative’s language, so as to reduce the 
likelihood of an initiative that contains vague, self-contradictory, or 
even counter-productive language.343 Accordingly, the OIS’s mission 
could include assisting proponents in drafting initiatives. (Any such 
additional responsibilities are not necessary in order to fix 
Hollingsworth.) 
340. Strictly speaking, no fix is needed to give official proponents standing to defend an
initiative in state courts, because, under California law, the proponents already possess such 
standing. Perry v. Bown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011). However, the fixes we 
propose in this Article are not limited to federal litigation, because having the state pay for 
lawyers to defend an initiative—instead of relying on the proponents to retain and pay 
lawyers—may improve the quality of initiative defense, regardless of the court. On the other 
hand, our proposed fixes could be limited to just federal litigation if such a limitation would 
enhance the political prospects of a fix being adopted. 
341. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3.
342. Venue in most pre-election initiative cases, and many other election disputes, is
exclusively in the Superior Court for Sacramento County. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9092, 
13314, 15001, 16421 (West 2015). For symmetry, and because of that court’s acquired expertise, 
we feel it is the most appropriate venue for the judicial proceedings suggested here. 
343. See, e.g., JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE 
THE GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 175 (2010); Robert M. Stern, California Should 
Return to the Indirect Initiative, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 671, 683 (2011). 
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2. Special Counsel
A second structural solution would be to provide for the 
appointment of a special counsel to represent California or localities 
in a way similar to the OIS, but on an ad hoc basis: 
(1) Upon petition to the Superior Court for Sacramento
County344 and notice to the parties by one or more of an initiative’s 
proponents, at any time during the pendency of a lawsuit challenging 
the initiative, the court shall determine within five court days, or 
such shorter or longer time as the interest of justice may require, 
whether to appoint special counsel to defend the initiative’s validity 
in court. The governor, attorney general, or other authorized state or 
local officials may oppose or support the petition. 
(2) If the initiative’s proponents show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the governor, attorney general, or other authorized 
officials are either (a) likely to refuse to defend the initiative at trial 
or on appeal or (b) likely to be less than vigorous in defending the 
initiative at trial or on appeal, then the court shall grant the petition 
and make the appointment described in paragraph (i). The special 
counsel shall be an active member of the State Bar of California and 
shall be of such experience and standing as to be able to undertake 
the representation. 
(3) Upon accepting the appointment, the special counsel (and all
persons hired by the special counsel) shall take the oath required of 
all California public officers and employees, and the special counsel 
then shall be authorized to represent the state or locality in court 
proceedings to defend the initiative’s validity. In providing this 
defense, the special counsel shall be authorized to take all reasonable 
steps, giving due consideration to the views of the initiative’s 
proponents as defined in section 9001(a) of the California Elections 
Code or in equivalent local laws. 
(4) The special counsel shall be authorized to employ such
lawyers and staff and to incur such reasonable expenses as may be 
appropriate to undertake this representation. 
(5) The special counsel’s authority shall not preclude
participation in court by (a) other authorized state or local officials 
who have responsibilities under the law or (b) the initiative’s 
proponents, whether their positions are complimentary or opposing. 
344. See note 319, supra.
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(6) The attorney general or the Sacramento County Superior
Court on its own motion shall have the right to seek to terminate the 
special counsel’s representation upon a showing in the court that the 
special counsel has exceeded or abused his or her authority. 
(7) The appointment and authority of the special counsel shall
lapse upon the termination of the lawsuit(s), unless the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County extends his or her term for purposes 
related to the defense or enforcement of the challenged initiative. 
3. Enacting the Permanent Fixes
Assuming that one or both of the above fixes would pass Article 
III standing muster, substantial questions remain as to how they 
could be implemented. 
First, the OIS or special counsel could be added to the California 
Constitution via an amendment proposed by the Legislature. 
However, it takes a two-thirds vote in the Senate and the Assembly 
to propose a constitutional amendment.345 With the Legislature—or, 
at least, many legislators—unsympathetic to the initiative process 
generally, it may be politically difficult for the requisite two-thirds of 
each house to vote for a constitutional amendment which would 
enhance the prospect of initiatives being defended. 
Second, such a constitutional amendment could be proposed via 
the initiative process, and thereby bypass the Legislature.346 
However, it may be difficult to raise the millions of dollars needed to 
gather 800,000 signatures. In addition, whether the constitutional 
amendment is proposed by the legislature or via the initiative 
process, it still would take a majority of votes in a statewide election 
for the amendment to pass. 
Third, the OIS or special counsel could be provided by statute 
enacted by the Legislature, but a statutory fix poses its own 
problems. To be sure, a statutory enactment requires only a majority 
vote in each house of the Legislature (instead of two-thirds) and does 
not require a vote of the people, but even a majority vote in the 
Legislature might not be forthcoming. In addition, a statute might be 
vulnerable to a state constitutional challenge. Under the California 
Constitution, the California attorney general has the duty “to see that 
345. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
346. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
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the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”347 
Statutes containing similar provisions exist.348 If, for example, the 
attorney general took the position that an initiative was 
unconstitutional and the OIS or special counsel took the opposite 
position, would there be an unconstitutional lack of “uniformity” or, 
more generally, an unconstitutional encroachment of the attorney 
general’s authority? In all likelihood, this challenge would not 
succeed. The California Supreme Court has expressly held, “These 
constitutional and statutory provisions . . . have never been 
interpreted to mean that the Attorney General is the only person or 
entity that may assert the state’s interest in the validity of a state law 
in a proceeding in which the law’s validity is at issue.”349 
Accordingly, that an OIS or special counsel might have a 
non-exclusive right to represent California is not a breach of 
California’s existing constitution or statutes. 
Fourth, a statute could be proposed via the initiative process. A 
statutory initiative would require only about 500,000 valid 
signatures, but still would require millions of dollars to gather 
signatures and would require a majority of votes in the next 
statewide election for the statute to pass. 
Finally, regardless of which methods might allow an OIS or 
special counsel to be implemented, initiative proponents might object 
that the fix would not give them (the proponents) direct control over 
the litigation. Theoretically, an initiative constitutional amendment 
or statute might name the proponents as state representatives and 
require them to take the California officials’ oath, in an attempt to 
meet the Hollingsworth standing requirements. However, the 
Hollingsworth criteria listed at the beginning of this part 
are substantive, not just formal. It is unlikely that those 
criteria—especially the requirements that the state must exercise 
control over its representatives and that the representatives owe 
fiduciary obligations to the state—would be satisfied with the 
initiative’s proponents simply being named as the state’s 
representatives. 
347. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
348. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12512 (West 2014) (“The Attorney General shall . . .
prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State officer is a party in his or her 
official capacity.”). 
349. Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1025 (Cal. 2011).
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In sum, an OIS- or special counsel-type solution, flawed as it is, 
may be preferable to initiatives’ proponents having no role in 
defending a passed initiative, which is the position they find 
themselves in now after Hollingsworth. 
C. Initiative Specific Fix
Given the political difficulty of amending the California 
Constitution or adding statutes to create an OIS or to authorize a 
special counsel, we are not optimistic that either of the permanent 
fixes could be enacted. However, as an alternative, initiative 
proponents might be able to add language to their proposed 
initiatives that allows for the appointment of a special counsel similar 
to that discussed above. It is no surprise that this is the route that 
many proponents of initiatives filed since Hollingsworth have taken. 
As described below, these efforts will probably not all meet with 
success. 
Specifically, an article could be added to the proposed initiative 
titled “Defending This Initiative,” which would include the authority 
of any of the initiative’s “official proponents” to petition the Superior 
Court of Sacramento County for appointment of a special counsel 
under the same terms and conditions set forth above. This fix is 
similar to the one contained in the proposed “High Quality Teachers 
Act of 2014”: the California attorney general must appoint an 
independent counsel to “faithfully defend this Act on behalf of the 
State . . . .”350 
The option of initiative proponents including language to 
appoint themselves as “agents” of the state for purposes of defending 
their measure has been included in several proposed 
post-Hollingsworth California initiatives.351 This has two critical 
flaws. First, as a matter of California law, this option—by appointing 
individual proponents as agents—probably violates California 
Constitution Article II, Section 12 which prohibits the submission of 
any statutory or constitutional initiative “that names any individual to 
350. High Quality Teachers Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 13-0062, § 14(a); see Cal. Initiative 14-
0009-Revenue Bonds. Infrastructure Projects. 
351. E.g., The Online Privacy Act, No. 14-0007, § 5(a) (Jan. 16, 2014) (“The people of the
State of California declare that the proponents of this Act have a direct and personal stake in 
defending this Act and grant formal authority to the proponents to defend this Act in any legal 
proceeding . . . [T]he proponents shall: (1) act as agents of the people and the State.”); see Cal. 
Initiative 15-0004—“The California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act.” 
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hold any office . . . .” Second, as a matter of federal law, it would 
likely run into the same problems as proponents faced in 
Hollingsworth. In essence, we do not believe that the Supreme Court 
will accept such designation as satisfying Article III without the 
“republican” safeguard of supervision by existing state structures. 
Accordingly, the appointment of an unnamed special counsel seems 
a safer course. This approach has the added benefit of already 
having been accepted by the Supreme Court against a federal 
separation-of-powers challenge.352 That doesn’t guarantee its success 
for Article III purposes, but it at least avoids having self-appointed 
“private attorneys general” using the federal courts to vindicate their 
view of the public interest. 
Official proponents pursue narrow interests in the initiatives 
they craft. Indeed, they must lest they run afoul of the single subject 
limitation.353 Accordingly, initiative drafters do not typically 
consider the full range of competing state interests as they pursue 
their policy objectives. “Nor do they have a ‘fiduciary obligation’ . . . 
to the people of California.”354 Most importantly, they are not under 
the control of the state, although that is the whole idea of direct 
democracy. Yet, these features of “agency” are now written into the 
law of standing. Under Hollingsworth initiative drafters are severely 
limited in their ability to defend their measures. But, they do have the 
other options described here, if enacted, to help assure that their 
efforts are not simply vetoed by executive officials who may 
disagree with them. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article first looks backward, presenting certain assertions 
about the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry. One 
of these is the authors’ opinion: that the Court wrongly decided the 
case. It did so by rejecting the California Supreme Court’s 
formulation of the state’s law, and choosing instead a federal rule of 
decision based on the formulae set forth in the Restatement (Third) 
of Agency. The other assertions are factual: that, after Hollingsworth, 
proponents will no longer be able to appeal lower federal court 
rulings that have found their initiatives to be unconstitutional, and, 
352. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
353. See Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1020.
354. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2657.
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following from that conclusion, state constitutional officers do 
indeed possess a “veto” over challenged initiatives. 
Following these assertions, the Article looks forward. First, it 
presents some informed speculation concerning initiative cases, in 
the trial courts and on appeal, that may present histories that differ 
enough from that of Hollingsworth so as to allow a different result. 
Next, and perhaps most importantly, the Article presents several 
suggested “fixes” that would: (1) use existing California law to force 
an energetic defense of challenged initiatives by constitutional 
officers; or (2) provide for state control over initiative challenge 
defenses by substituting an officer or an agency that would provide 
such a defense, or (3) by language included in the initiative itself, 
allow initiative proponents to initiate a process that will lead to the 
appointment of such an agent. 
The substantive issue underlying Hollingsworth—the 
constitutionality of state laws barring same-sex marriage—was 
recently resolved in Obergefell v. Hodges. But the standing issue 
remains unsettled. Constitutional scholars, state officials, and 
initiative drafters will grapple with Hollingsworth for years to come. 
Without some fix, whether one proposed here or some other, the 
Supreme Court has dealt a severe blow to direct democracy and “the 
people’s rightful control over their government.”355 
355. Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1016.
